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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to investigate public 
opinion on the Panama Canal treaties as a possible exception, 
to the usual apathy of the American people toward foreign 
affairs.
A telephone survey was taken in March, 1977» in trie 
Williamsburg, Virginia area to determine if public concern 
for this foreign policy issue was unusually high. In 
October, 1977> a second survey was taken because the treaty 
negotiations had been concluded and the documents submitted 
to the Senate for ratification.
It had been hypothesized that this foreign affairs issue 
would be salient for the American public because it was seen 
as a bread and butter issue. The results suggested that 
there was not a great deal of public interest in the Panama 
Canal issue generally, but that among those segments of the 
population for whom the issue was salient, opposition to the 
canal treaty was based on defense, trade, and the control of 
the canal.
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THE PANAMA CANAL TREATIES 
POSSIBLE EXCEPTION TO THE USUAL RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN PUBLIC OPINION AND FOREIGN POLICY
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research is to investigate the 
relationship between public opinion and the ratification of 
the Panama Canal treaties as a possible exception to the 
usual relationship between public opinion and foreign policy. 
This possibility was raised by the effective use of the 
canal treaty proposals by Ronald Reagan in the 1976 primary 
campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, and a 
long history of congressional opposition to new treaties.
Such an investigation seemed particularly relevant since the 
negotiations were at a virtual standstill when the study 
was begun and the treaties have now received final 
ratification by the Senate.
Public opinion can be described as a set of expressed 
beliefs or preferences relating to some policy held by the 
people as a whole, or at least a large number of them. This 
opinion becomes of interest to political scientists when the 
beliefs or preferences are concerned with the government or 
public policy.
2
3Public opinion is considered to be particularly 
important in a democracy because
Popularized versions of democratic theory often 
presuppose . . . the "omnicompetent" citizen. In
particular they have assumed three things about 
the voter: (1 ) that he is attentive to and informed
about the persons and issues in public life, (2 ) that 
he accurately perceives the alternative positions 
taken by each political party or major faction in 
important policy disputes, and (3 ) that he holds 
some one of the apparently common versions of 
political ideology . . .  so that he can assess 
political alternatives by referring to his own 
ideological predispositions.^
Political scientists have long recognized that the 
democratic assumption of a well-informed public capable of 
making policy decisions does not coincide with the realities 
of American democracy. In reality, the American public 
is generally not very well informed about the public policies 
and decisions made on its behalf by elected officials. In 
idealized or popular democratic theory political disinterest
or apathy is not permitted; in democratic reality it does
• + 2 exist.
The theoretical faith in the interest and participation 
of the general public in governmental affairs was seriously 
questioned by Walter Lippmann in 1925 in The Phantom Public.
V. 0 . Key concluded, "Mr. Lippmann demolished whatever illusion
David 0. Sears, "Political Behavior," in The Handbook 
of Social Psychology, ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot 
Aronson (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing
Co., 1969), p. 32^.
2Bernard Berelson, "Democratic Theory and Public Opinion," 
Public Opinion Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 3 (Fall, 1952), p. 316.
kexisted that * the public' could be regarded as an
omnicompetent and omniscient collectivity equipped to decide
the affairs of state." Mr. Lippmann made it clear that the
average man had little time for the affairs of state; man's
major concern is his own private well-being. Bernard Berelson
also recognized that the voter did not really match this
theoretical description. He said, "If the democratic system
depended solely on the qualifications of the individual voter,
then it seems remarkable that democracies have survived through
Athe centuries."
There have been many studies of public opinion and the
extent of voter knowledge on public issues and they are
almost uniformly pessimistic about the informed involvement
of the average citizen. In a classic work, American Voter,
Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes report:
Our detailed inquiry into public attitudes 
regarding what we took to be the most prominent
political issues of the time revealed a
substantial lack of familiarity with these 
policy questions. Our measures have shown 
the public's understanding of policy issues 
to be poorly developed . . . Neither do we find
much evidence of the kind of structured 
political thinking that we might expect to
characterize a well-informed electorate.r
5
L. W. Milbraith, in his study of participation by the
3
-'V. 0. Key, Jr., Public Opinion and American Democracy 
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1961), p. 5«
kBernard Berelson, "Democratic Practice and Democratic 
Theory," in Public Opinion and Public Policy, ed. by Norman R. 
Luttbeg (Homewood, Illinois: The Dorsey Press, 197^)» P» 20.
5
^Angus Campbell, et. al, American Voter: An Abridgement
(New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 196k ), pp. 281-282.
5electorate, had similar findings.
About one-third of the American adult population 
can be characterized as politically apathetic or 
passive; in most cases, they are unaware, literally, 
of the political part of the world around them.
Another 60 per cent play largely spectator roles 
in the political process; they watch, they cheer, 
they vote, but they do not do battle. In the 
purest sense of the word, probably only 1 or 2 
per cent could be called gladiators.^
Politics appears, then, to be a subject about which 
most citizens are rather indifferent. Cantril, in his 
study of things that concern people most, asked Americans 
about the nature of their fondest hopes and worst fears. 
Political matters were mentioned by 2 per cent as their 
"fondest hope" and by 5 per cent as their "worst fear."
The international situation was mentioned by ten per cent 
and 24- per cent respectively. Of much greater importance 
to the respondents were their families’ economic and health 
situations. Eetter economic status was most hoped for by
n
65 per cent, better health by 46 per cent. Thus, from this 
study it was clear that personal lives were far more salient 
to the average person's thoughts that political matters, 
though, of course, the two categories could overlap as, for 
example, in the time of war.
In their study of the influence of constituent opinion
^L. W. Milbraith, Political Participation (Chicago:
Rand McNally, 1965), P* 21.
n
Hadley Cantril, The Patterns of Human Behavior (New 
Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1965), P« 36.
6on the voting behavior of congressmen, Miller and Stokes 
concluded that
. . . most Americans are almost totally uninformed 
about legislative issues in Washington. At best 
the average citizen may be said to have some general 
ideas about how the country should be run, which 
he is able to use in responding to particular 0 
questions about what the government ought to do.
The conclusion that the mass public is generally not well 
informed, not interested, and not inclined to think very deeply 
about government policy issues seems widely agreed upon by 
American political scientists. This lack of interest and 
information seems to include the field of foreign affairs.
Even though Cantril found more concern with international 
affairs than political issues in general, the percentage 
expressing such concern was notably small and they probably 
had less structured opinions in foreign than in domestic 
politics .
Robinson was particularly appalled by the lack of public 
interest and information in the field of foreign affairs.
Survey researchers and other social scientists 
who have examined the results of typical poll data 
have found that the vast majority of citizens hold 
pictures of the world that are at best sketchy, 
blurred and without detail or at worst so impoverished 
as to beggar description. The restricted horizons 
become particularly evident when one examines the 
public's inability to give satisfactory answers to 
objective questions related to world affairs.^
g
Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, "Constituency 
Influence in Congress," Public Opinion Quarterly, LVII, Mo. 1 
(March, 1963)# p* ^7•
9'John P. Robinson, Public Information about World Affairs 
(Ann Arbor, Michigan! Institute for Social Research, 1967)» P« 39.
7In their study of the impact of war costs, public 
opinion, and anti-war demonstrations on congressional 
voting on Vietnam war bills, Paul Burstein and William 
Freudenburg concluded that "the public is not very attentive 
to foreign policy questions, and legislators are not likely 
to pay much attention to public opinion on issues that are 
not salient to the public.
Bernard C. Cohen, in a study of foreign policy-making 
and the Japanese peace treaty after World War II, looked at 
the relationship between public opinion and policy 
formulation, and it is particularly interesting to compare 
public reaction to this treaty with present reactions to the 
Panama Canal treaties. He distinguished two ways in which 
the public can influence policy-making. One is by creating 
a climate in which policy must be made, an example of which 
is the isolationism of the 1920's and 1930's. The other 
method by which the public can influence policy-making is 
through the active and articulate expression of opinion on 
policy issues.^ He concluded that at the time of the
■^Paui Burstein and William Freudenburg, "Ending the 
Vietnam War: The Impact of War Costs, Public Opinion, and
Anti-War Demonstrations on Senate Voting on Vietnam War Bills," 
(Paper presented at the 1976 annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 2-5,
1976), p. 29.
Bernard C. Cohen, The Political Process and Foreign 
Policy: The Making: of the Japanese Peace Settlement (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), P« 29-
8Japanese peace settlement in 1951* "the public was operating
in the first of these:
American opinion on Japan was permissive and 
tolerant, giving policy-makers wide latitude in 
their search for internationally acceptable 
policy substance. Popular restraints on their 
freedom to decide in concrete terms how Japan 
should be treated were few.-^
This permissiveness and lack of restraint, after a
bitterly fought and costly war, is further demonstrated by
the fact that 29 per cent of the public had neither heard nor
read anything about the peace treaty and 16 per cent of those
18who were aware had no opinion on the merits of the document. ^
A fuller sense of the lack of concern and of information
on the part of the American public is conveyed by investigations
which probed the apathy and ignorance of the American people.
In August, 19^5, as the war ended, approximately half of the
population admitted that they had not heard or read anything
about the surrender terms the Allies had presented to Japan
the week before. At the end of the year, 55 per cent of
the people polled did not have a "fairly clear idea" of what
1AAmerican policy was towards Japan.
This, then, was the character of American public 
opinion on the issues raised by a peace treaty with Japan: 
neither interested nor informed, yet quite tolerant of the
~^Ibid . , p . 57 . 
^ Ibid . , p. 58 • 
l4Ibid., pp. 53-5^
new, more generous approach to Japan. Apparently the American 
citizen's concern with foreign policy vis-a-vis Japan ended 
with the war and its direct effect on their personal lives.
A treaty per se lacked the personal relevance seemingly 
necessary for informed involvement in international affairs.
In 1962 and 1963 Hazel Gaudet Erskine summarized results 
from numerous representative polls on international affairs 
for the Public Opinion Quarterly. These results, again, 
reveal a vast lack of knowledge in large segments of the 
population. In questions asked in 19^8, 19^9» and 1953»
^2 per cent of those polled had not heard of the Atlantic 
Pact, 55 per* cent had not heard of radio programs that our 
country was broadcasting to the Russian people, and 81 per 
cent had not heard or read anything about Senator Bricker's 
controversial proposed Constitutional amendment to limit 
the President's treaty-making powers. Moreover, in a question 
asked in 19^?» slightly more than half of the respondents had 
not heard or read anything about the widely publicized 
Marshall Plan for European recovery. This percentage 
fluctuated during the next three years, but by February,
1950» 35 per cent of those polled had neither heard nor 
read of the Marshall Plan.^
Even when an issue does capture the attention of a 
large segment of the people, they may have great difficulty
"^Hazel Gaudet Erskine, "The Polls: Exposure to
International Information," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28,
No. b (1963b), pp. 658-659.
in formulating an informed opinion on the subject. John £. 
Mueller, in War, Presidents and Public Opinion, found that 
public opinion on many war issues was marked by uncertainty, 
indecision and vacillation. "To deal with this uncertainty 
and indecision, many in the population grope for cues on
A
which to base their opinion. The perceived issue position
of various opinion leaders is very often taken as an
important guide." The most important opinion leader is,
obviously, the president, and many "followers" are inclined
to "rally to the support of the president no matter what
he does."^ Mueller claims that, because of the follower
phenomenon, there are often major shifts in public opinion
on questions of policy after policy changes have occurred.
For example, the Harris poll reported that support for bombing
the Hanoi-Haiphong area increased in a major way after the
bombing of military targets there was begun in 1966. "What
this phenomenon means, of course, is that, if one wishes to
assess the American public’s 'opinion* on an issue, it is
essential that consideration be taken of what the administration1
17policy was at the time the poll question was posed." '
It is obvious from this analysis of American public 
opinion on policy, and particularly foreign policy, that as 
Robinson argues, a large proportion of the people
16John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion 
(Hew York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973)» P* 69.
^ Ibid., p. 71•
11
in the United States
see no real continuing connection between their 
concerns and the foreign policies and affairs 
of the country. Most people have become well 
accustomed to attaching the overwhelming 
proportion of their energies and interests to 
activities involving their families, their work, 
friends, clubs and local civic problems.
They rarely think about political issues because the world 
of politics is one towards which they are quite indifferent. 
Personal lives are much more salient in the average person’s 
thinking than political matters.
It would be inaccurate to conclude from this analysis 
that everyone in the mass public is uninformed. Various’ 
estimates are given as to the actual size of the "interested” 
public, usually ranging from one-third to one-fifth, or even 
smaller. This group is not representative of the general 
public but is made up of more highly educated (college or 
above), white-collar workers who generally have a higher 
socio-economic standing than the public-at-large. In 
addition, this group receives its information about public 
issues from a larger variety of sources including those that 
are more specialized and analytic. ^  These people are likely 
to be the opinion leaders for the majority of the public.
Cohen found that Americans who had been to college 
were comparatively well informed on the issues and implications
18Robinson, Op. cit., p. 51• 
^^Ibid., pp. 18-33*
12
of Japanese-American relations and more likely to be
tolerant. Almond labeled them the ’’attentive public," an
informed and interested stratum before whom elite discussion
and controversy take place. According to Almond, the
function of the attentive public is to subject policy to
informed criticism.20
Amitai Etzioni, in a study of the social-psychological
aspects of international relations also noted the relationship
between increased knowledge and increased public action. He
looked at elections
. . .  as societal actions, as a way in which society 
chooses among its elites and among alternative 
courses of action . . .  In general, citizens with 
more education, a better standard of living, 
higher social status, more leadership skills and 
experience, and key positions in organizations,
have more effect on the societal course than those
who fall lower in these dimensions
A paradox arises in studies of this better informed 
and more interested segment of the public. Rather than come 
to independent judgments as one might expect, they actually 
tend to be more supportive of official policy than those less 
well informed, and their opinions fluctuate to correspond 
with changes in official policy. In his study of public
20Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign 
Policy (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1950)»
p. 228.
21Amitai Etzioni, "Social-Psychological Aspects of 
International Behavior," in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 
ed. by Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (Reading, 
Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Co., I969), p. 57^ •
13
opinion on nuclear weapons tests and fallouts, E. J. Rosi
observed that more of the attentive public appeared to
respond positively and rapidly to the setting of policy
by the administration than was true of the mass public.
For example, in 1961-62 the informed increasingly favored
test resumption, but switched more sharply to the test ban
22treaty in 1963 when the administration endorsed it.
Sears had similar findings:
There is some evidence that additional information 
on foreign policy issues, rather than polarizing 
opinion, increases support for official government 
policy. . . Higher information levels, as indexed by 
amount of factual information, have been associated 
with greater support of official policy in several 
studies.^
The American public, therefore, has been characterized 
by low interest and lack of knowledge in public affairs in 
general and foreign policy in particular. While a large 
majority of the people are uninformed and apathetic, there 
is a small core group of "attentive" people who are interested 
and informed about policy, but this group generally tends to 
be supportive rather than critical of administrative action. 
There is little evidence that, as a general rule, public 
opinion operates to influence the formation of foreign policy.
22E. J. Rosi, "Mass and Attentive Opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons Tests and Fallout, 195^~1963»" Public Opinion 
Quarterly, 29 (1965)» p* 293*
2*^Sears, Op, cit., pp. 351-352.
1A
or works in any significant way to shape or modify such policy 
when it is proposed by the government; it is more likely to
follow the lead of the policy-makers.
There have been exceptions to the general rule. Some 
foreign policy issues are apparently more salient for the 
American people than the foregoing analysis would indicate. 
Although the war in Vietnam did not concern large segments 
of the public in its early years, it became more important 
as it dragged on. Paul Burstein and William Freudenburg
found that adverse public opinion and war demonstrations were
highly correlated with the increasing costs of the war.
Costs, of course, include not only dollars but casualties, 
neglected social programs, and political unrest. "The most 
obvious interpretation is that the general public, as well 
as the anti-war demonstrators, were extremely sensitive to 
the costs of the war; as costs escalated without compensating 
benefit, people turned against the war."" Mueller made a 
similar conclusion that public support for wars (Korea and
P C
Vietnam) declined as the length and costs of the wars grew.
The declining support for the wars was also related to the 
casualty rate. "Every time American casualties increased by 
a factor of 10, support for the war dropped by about 15 
percentage points.
2kBurstein, Op. cit., p. 35* 
^Mueller, Op. cit., p. 260. 
26Ibid.. p. 60.
15
One explanation for the unusual coalescing of reaction
to these wars is that economic costs and higher casualty
rates touched people directly and, thus, were viewed by the
public as personal concerns. War costs could be considered
a "bread-and-butter" issue which people take personally and
is, therefore, highly salient. James N. Rosenau theorized
that foreign policy becomes salient for the American public
when those issues can be interpreted as "bread-and-butter"
27issues .
The Panama Canal treaty issue seems to be another 
exception to the general rule of public apathy towards foreign 
policy issues. Ronald Reagan focused the public's attention 
on the Panama Canal by making it a campaign issue in the 1976 
presidential primaries. As early as August, 1975* he began 
attacking President Ford and Secretary of State Kissinger for 
their negotiations with Panama over a new treaty that would 
eventually give the Panamanians control over the canal and 
the Canal Zone. Reagan's criticism reached its peak in 1976 
in the Texas primary campaign with his accusation that Ford 
was planning to give the Panama Canal to a "tinhorn dictator 
friend of Fidel Castro's." He added, "Personally, I would
v
tell this jerk we bought it, we paid for it, and we are going 
28to keep it." Reagan went on to say:
27(James N. Rosenau, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy 
(Hew York: Random House, 1961), pp. 99-100.
28 "Reagan's Startling Texas Landslide," Time, May 10,
1976, p. 10.
16
The Canal Zone is not a colonial possession. It 
is not a long-term lease. It is sovereign U . S. 
territory, every bit the same as Alaska and all 
the states that were carved from the Louisiana 
Purchase.^
This rhetoric reflects what many Americans have 
learned about the Panama Canal in the classroom as children. 
There was little recognition of the fact that the United 
States leases the canal from Panama and has powers and rights 
as if it were sovereign United States territory. It was not 
bought, it was leased in perpetuity. Nevertheless, many 
Americans are unconvinced by such reasoning.
The fact that a candidate for a major political office 
would choose to make treaty negotiations a campaign issue 
suggests his belief that this foreign affairs question had 
become or could be made salient for Americans. It could be 
argued that Reagan attempted to make the Panama Canal a 
public issue as part of his campaign strategy to separate 
himself from his opponent. This may be true; it remains clear 
that there was a strong public reaction to this particular 
foreign policy issue as measured by polls and press coverage, 
and contrary to the usual public apathy over foreign affairs.
President Ford apparently felt that his public support 
of the negotiations with Panama could be politically 
disadvantageous in an election year and tried to put the issue 
to one side until the election was over. Jimmy Carter
29
Canal Zone: Political Issue in the U. S., Time Bomb
in Panama," U. S > Nev/s & World Report, April 2.6, 1976, p. 2k.
17
avoided the issue when possible and made only general
statements when questioned directly about his stand on the
problem. All of these men believed that the subject of Panama
was a volatile one. In a television interview in 1976, former
Governor John Connally of Texas said that Reagan's position
on the Panama Canal had been a major factor in his primary
victory there over President Ford. He said,
To us, the Panama Canal is just across the Gulf 
of Mexico. They're our neighbors, so to speak.
Houston is the third-largest port in the United 
States and most of our shipping goes through the 
Panama Canal, so there's a real sensitivity to 
the control of the Panama Canal in Texas.
Strong public opinion regarding our interest in Panama
is not a new phenomenon. In 1964, during the disturbances
over a flag-flying incident in the Canal Zone, almost
two-thirds of the Americans questioned indicated they had
been following the dispute. when further questioned as to
hov/ the United States should solve the problem, 45 per cent
favored a "firm" policy without concessions while only 9
per cent felt that concessions should be made or that the
31canal should be given to Panama.
It should be noted that in 1964, when 64 per cent of 
Americans polled said they had been following the Panama 
dispute, 63 per cent of those polled on Vietnam said they
30^ Richard Hudson, "Storm Over the Canal," New York Times 
Magazine , May 16, 1976, p. 18.
•^George H. Gallup, The Gallup Polls Public Opinion 1935- 
1971, Vol. Ill (New York: Random House, 1972)*
18
32had given little or no attention to Vietnam. Americans 
were not very interested in that war, but they were clearly 
interested in Panama.
Further evidence to suggest that Americans have been 
atypically aroused by the dispute over the Panama Canal 
negotiations may be found in congressional reaction. A 
congressman can frequently cite the number of letters he 
has received from constituents to support his position on 
a particular issue. In addition, congressmen will conduct 
their own private polls to determine what the public actually 
thinks about a number of things. Although it may be argued 
that these polls and letters do not represent the total public 
view, it stands to reason that congressmen are affected by 
them and their actions will, therefore, reflect these opinions. 
There is some evidence that congressmen frequently do not 
correctly perceive the views of the constituents, but Panama 
may be the exception to this rule.
Burstein and Freudenburg found that Senators did pay 
attention to war costs, public opinion, and demonstrations 
when they were considering Vietnam legislation, and that 
congressmen believe their stands on issues influence their 
electoral chances. Not all foreign policy issues are salient 
to the public, but when an issue is salient, legislators are 
not likely to ignore the views of their constituents.^^
-^Mueller, Op. cit., p. 81.
33Burs tern, Op. cit., pp. 29~30.
19
Congressional opposition to renegotiation of the Panama 
Canal treaty in a way that would relinquish American control 
over the canal and the Canal Zone has been intense. In 
October, 1975» a sense of Congress resolution was approved 
in both the House and the Senate saying "that the
Administration should protect the vital interests of the
United States in the Canal Zone and in any new Panama Canal 
pact." In addition, thirty-seven Senators, led by Senator 
Strom Thurmond submitted a resolution to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in 1976 "urging retention of undiluted 
United States sovereignty over the Canal Zone."^ Ambassador- 
at-large Ellsworth Bunker has stated that the opposition to 
the treaty in Congress reflects "to a considerable degree 
the sentiments of many citizens and considerable public 
education is needed if a new treaty is not to be regarded 
as bad politics domestically."
The "follower" phenomenon in foreign policy described 
by Mueller also may not seem to apply.to the canal issue. If
the follower phenomenon were operative, presidents would have
been able to lead the American public to accept the new- 
treaties long before now. Attempts have been made since
3 A
^ "Controversy over Proposed Panama Canal Treaty 
Revision," Congressional Digest, April, 1976, p. 107.
33-^Hudson, Op. cit., p. 19*
o
Ellsworth Bunker, "The Panama Canal Negotiations: 
Popular Myths and Political Realities," The Department of 
State Bulletin, LXII, No. 109^ (December 22, 1975)» P» 883*
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1964 to complete a new treaty with Panama. Successive 
presidents have declared their support for such a treaty, 
but adverse public and congressional opinions have consistently 
thwarted their attempts to conclude the treaties and have them 
ratified by the Senate. This is being accomplished how, but 
only after the adoption of major amendments that protect 
American interests and answer the concern of the American 
public.
All of these sources seem to indicate that there has 
been atypically strong public opposition to relinquishing 
control of the Panama Canal to Panama and, moreover, that 
this public opinion has been effective in delaying 
bi-partisan presidential efforts to have the treaties 
accepted by the public and approved by the Senate. The 
public opposition has now resulted in major amendments to 
the treaties originally signed and submitted by the president.
This paper will investigate the possibility that the 
Panama Canal treaties represent an atypical exception to the 
usual relationship between public opinion and foreign policy 
and the treaties could be ratified only because the demands 
of the American public had been met and the United States' 
interest had been protected by. amendments to the original 
treaties. The question is why is Panama such a salient 
issue for the American public? In what way is Panama different 
from other areas of foreign policy where the public is 
generally disinterested and apathetic? Rosenau has pointed 
out that there is practically no thing known about why one
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situation abroad never becomes the subject of public 
discussion, whereas another becomes a cause celebre. As 
Cantril's study indicates, the mass public is much more 
concerned with personal issues that with political issues.
One explanation for the interest in Panama is that the people 
see it in more personal terms than other foreign policy issues. 
But why.? Certainly Ronald Reagan's assertion that "it is 
sovereign U. S. territory, every bit the same as Alaska and 
all the states that were carved from the Louisians. Purchase," 
though legally inaccurate, reflects the deep feelings of 
possession that Americans have about Panama. They seem to 
agree that "we bought it, we paid for it, and we are going 
to keep it. "
It is clear that there has been strong opposition to 
the Panama Canal treaties. This is particularly puzzling 
when this reaction is compared to American apathy toward the 
Japanese peace treaty. Public opposition could be based on 
objective, impersonal reasoning to the effect that the United 
States control of the canal is essential to the national 
defense of the United States and that foreign control of the 
canal would pose a threat to national security. Opposition 
could also be of a more subjective, personal nature such as 
pride of ownership, or fear that relinquishing control would 
"cost" in terms of goods and services and the availability 
of products that are shipped through the canal.
The objective arguments seem easily answered. There is 
little reason, either military or economic, not to relinquish
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control of the canal to Panama because neither supertankers 
nor the larger aircraft carriers can pass through. Many of 
the new sea vessels must go around the Cape because they will 
not fit in the locks of the canal. This inconvenience has not 
noticeably hindered military operations or commercial shipping. 
In addition, the canal is extremely difficult to defend. New 
types of ex plosives can be strategically placed, and, in time 
of war, the canal is particularly vulnerable to missile or 
submarine attack. For these reasons, the Navy no longer 
considers use of the canal in planning for emergencies.
Advocates of a new treaty stress that the best defense 
of the canal is to give it to the Panamanians, which would 
reduce or eliminate the possibility of guerrilla attack.
If the United States retains control, It faces mounting, 
bitter hostility in Panama which could eventually lead to the 
destruction of the very interest that it wants to preserve. 
Accommodating Panama’s aspirations to exercise its 
sovereignty over the canal and the Canal Zone is considered 
to be "good foreign policy as well as good defense policy if,
through accommodation, the United States can safeguard its
37 .  .needs . Moreover, recognizing Panamanian sovereignty over
the canal would remove a major irritant in the relations 
between the United States and Latin America.
■^Richard W. Rastetter, "The Panama Canal," Daily Press, 
May 30, 1967, p. 5-
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Since ratification of the treaties would appear to be 
objectively good policy, the hypothesis of this paper is that 
the Panama Canal treaty issue is salient to the American 
people because the Panama Canal is subjectively seen as a 
very personal issue to most Americans. They believe that 
the canal symbolizes great American technological accomplish­
ments and its construction is a part of a romantic era in 
the history of our country. It represents an investment of 
American capital and American "know-how" and there is "pride 
of ownership." Many Americans may also believe that commerce 
between the east and west coasts would be more costly under 
a new treaty and that consumer prices would rise. It may be 
these "bread, butter and pride" issues, in addition to the 
impersonal issues of defense and Latin American relations that 
determine the saliency of this particular foreign policy Issue 
to the American public.
The purpose of this study, then, is to investigate 
whether the Panama Canal treaties do, in fact, represent an 
exception to the usual rule about public indifference toward 
foreign policy issues and, second, to discover, if possible, 
the basis of this concern.
The relevance of such a study is two-fold. First, if 
a more precise analysis can be made of the public opposition 
to the Panama Canal treaties, this will point to the direction 
that any attempts at public reeducation must take. It may be 
that past attempts to persuade the public have failed because 
they have not been aimed at overcoming the real reasons for
for the opposition. Second, such a study may add to the 
information already available on the relationship between 
public opinion and foreign policy in America and could 
eventually contribute to the formulation of a more comprehensive 
theory of this relationship.
CHAPTER II 
METHODOLOGY
As previously stated, the purpose of this research was 
to investigate the relationship between public opinion and 
the Panama Canal treaty ratification. It has been hypothesized 
that Panama, unlike other foreign policy issues, is salient 
to the American people. This saliency is due not only to 
reasons of defense or general military needs, but also to 
more subjective personal reasons. These include the fact 
that the canal represents a great technological accomplishment 
in which Americans justifiably feel great pride and that 
Americans see the canal as vital for trade and commerce, 
which, when translated into increased prices, becomes a "bread 
and butter" issue.
In order to test these hypotheses, it was decided to 
survey a number of people on their various views about the 
Panama Canal treaties and their interest in the negotiation 
of those treaties. Because particular subgroups--for example, 
older people, Republicans, the less educated, lower income 
groups, southerners, and individuals with military background-- 
might be found to oppose increased Panamanian control more 
than others, it seemed necessary to use a sample large enough 
to insure the adequate representation of these groups.
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The subjects were 201 people, 18 years of age or older, 
whose telephone numbers were in the i/tfill-iainsburg, Virginia 
telephone directory. Approximately 500 telephone numbers 
were chosen by list sampling procedures in the Williamsburg- 
James City County area, including numbers from such outlying 
areas as Toano, horge, Grove, and northern Nev/port News.
Every twentieth number from the telephone directory was 
selected. If that number happened to be a business, the 
next residential number following the business number was 
chosen. A total of 556 numbers were actually selected in 
this manner.
The numbers were dialed in order; 65 were busy, changed-, 
or disconnected when called; there were 95 "no answers."
In nine cases, there was no one eighteen or older at home 
at that time to respond to the questions. There were 47- 
subjects who answered the telephone but refused to respond 
to the questionnaire. The number of subjects who actually 
agreed to participate was 236 and, of these, 35 interviews 
could not be completed for various reasons. When 201 
interviews had been completed, no further calls were made; 
thus, 105 numbers were unused.
The survey was conducted in March, 1977» by fifteen 
high school senior girls who were instructed in telephone 
survey techniques. All of the calls were made in the same 
week, Monday through Thursday, between 6:30 p.m. and 9 0 0  p.m. 
The first adult to answer the telephone was taken as the 
subject. The interviewers introduced themselves by saying,
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"I am taking a public opinion survey for the Government 
Department at William and Mary. I would like to ask you some 
questions about issues facing the United States today.” In 
order to assure that all respondents were adults, the question 
was asked, "Are you eighteen years of age or older?" If the 
response was "yes," the interview continued; if the answer 
was "no," the person answering was asked if there was anyone 
at home eighteen or older. All of the survey interviews 
followed the same order and every effort was made to complete 
every interview once it had begun.
The questions asked in the interview were designed to 
determine what opinions the public actually held on Panama 
at the time of the survey, why people held these opinions, 
and the amount of factual information they had about the 
canal. There were four basic sections to the questionnaire. 
Three focused on information specifically related to the 
various hypotheses and the fourth was designed to elicit 
background information about the subjects.
The first section was concerned with general questions 
about important issues facing the United States today and 
v/as designed to find out whether foreign affairs generally 
and the Panama Canal negotiations in particular were foremost 
in the public's mind. This section began with open-ended 
questions which were not considered to be "leading" and moved 
towards greater structure until subjects were finally asked 
to rank the importance of canal negotiations when compared 
with four other foreign policy areas. The first question
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asked, "i/Vhat- do you see as the two most important problems 
facing the United States today?" The second question asked 
specifically, "khat about in the area of foreign affairs, 
what do you see as the most important problem facing the 
United States today?" The next question again focused on 
foreign policyt "Is there any other foreign affairs problem 
that you think is important?" Such open-ended questions 
were used to determine the general degree of the public's 
attention to foreign affairs issues as compared to domestic 
issues. Moreover, it was hoped that the foreign policy 
responses would indicate whether the public follows the 
government's lead in determining which foreign affairs issues 
are most important. Finally, the responses to these questions 
were aimed at obtaining information about the importance of 
the canal treaty negotiations.
The final two questions in this section listed five 
foreign policy issues and asked the respondents to rank them 
as to the most important and the second most important. with 
the exception of Panama, the issues listed were chosen because 
of their current coverage in the news and included (1) peace 
in the Middle Fast, (2) relations with the Soviet Union,
(3) human rights throughout the world, (4) Panama Canal treaty 
negotiations, and (5) majority rule in South Africa. These 
questions were obviously designed to get specific information 
about the relevance of the treaty negotiations.
The second section of the questionnaire was concerned 
with specific questions about the Panama Canal treaty
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negotiations. They were carefully designed to avoid forcing 
the respondent to take a position on the negotiations if 
no opinion existed. Most of these questions gave the respondent 
choices of answers to indicate the strength of his opinions 
as well. Two questions were open-ended and were aimed at 
probing opinions about the canal.
The first question in this section asked, "You have 
probably heard something about the negotiations between the 
United States and Panama over the new Panama Canal treaty.
"Do you agree that a new treaty should be negotiated, disagree, 
or haven't you formed an opinion yet?" The next question was 
even more specific. "One proposal would give Panama greater 
control over the canal. Would you favor or oppose such a 
a treaty or haven’t you formed an opinion about this?" These 
questions clearly distinguish between simply renegotiating 
and relinquishing control to the Panamanians and were, again, 
designed to provide a kind of scale of the "depth of concern" 
about the canal negotiations. The third question in this 
section was intended to measure the strength of the opinion 
held. "How strongly do you (favor) (oppose) giving Panama 
greater control over the canal--very strongly, strongly, 
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?"
The next tv/o questions were aimed at determining 
opinion on the direct effect of Panamanian control of the 
canal on the United States, and asked, "Do you feel that 
if Panama were given greater control over the canal it would 
have any effect on the United States directly?" This question
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was followed by an open-ended question asking for an expla­
nation of the response given in the previous question. "In 
what way do you think it would affect the United States?"
This question was included specifically to get information 
on the reasons for the saliency of the treaty issue to the 
people.
The next question was aimed at the possibility that 
saliency was based on defense. A statement was read: 
"American control of the canal is necessary for the defense 
of the United States," and the respondent was asked to agree 
or disagree. The strength of the response was measured in 
the next question by asking how strongly they agreed or 
disagreed that the canal was necessary for defense. This was 
followed by an open-ended question asking why they felt that 
control of the canal was or was not necessary for defense.
The final question in this section was, again, 
designed to assess the strength of the opinions held about 
the importance of the Panama Canal to the United States, 
"would you favor using United States'troops to keep control 
of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion about 
this yet?" Obviously, subjects willing to commit troops to 
the maintenance of control over the canal must have very 
strong feelings about the importance of the canal to the 
United States.
In the third section of the questionnaire, specific 
questions were asked which were designed to determine the 
amount of factual knowledge about the canal held by the
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respondents in order to test the hypothesis that more know­
ledgeable subjects would be more likely to favor renegotiation 
of the treaty. "Do you happen to remember the name of the 
United States president who was responsible for negotiating 
the original Panama Canal treaty?" "The present status of 
the canal is rather unclear. Do you happen to remember 
whether the United States owns or leases the canal or aren’t 
you sure?" The last question in this section was open-ended, 
"Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal in 
school. What' sticks in your mind most about the canal?"
This question was another attempt to get at the reasons for 
the saliency of the Panama Canal issue from the subjects 
themselves without the potential biasing effects of asking: 
for "yes" or "no" answers to specific questions about the 
canal.
The final section of the questionnaire asked personal 
information questions of the respondents including age, 
education, home state, military experience, religion, party 
preference, race, income, and sex. These questions were 
asked for the purpose of subgrouping subjects to test the 
various hypotheses having to do with group differences.
Follow-up Survey
As will be seen below, the results of the survey showed 
surprisingly little interest in the treaties among the subjects 
in this sample. However, significant developments in the 
treaty negotiations in the months immediately following 
the first survey, culminating in the formal signing of the
32
treaties by President Carter and General Omar Torrijos amidst 
great fanfare and publicity, suggested the possibility of 
heightened interest. Certainly this seemed to be the case 
nationally. Therefore, a second survey was conducted to 
determine if significant changes had occurred in public opinion 
and if the president had been able to lead the public to follow 
his opinions.
The subjects of the second survey were as many of those 
who had been .interviewed in the first survey as were still 
accessible. The interviews were conducted in October, 1977* 
again using high school senior girls who were instructed in 
telephone survey techniques. All of the calls were made in 
the same week, Monday through Wednesday, between 6:30 p.m. 
and 9 :30 p.m. Of the 201 originally questioned, there were 
70 disconnected phones, changed numbers or the respondent 
was not available, 26 refused to answer or only partially 
completed the second interview, 10 did not answer the phone; 
and 95 subjects actually completed the follow-up survey.
To begin the survey, the interviewers introduced 
themselves and said, "I am taking a public opinion survey 
for the Government Department at William and Mary. I called 
this number last March to ask some questions about issues 
facing the United States today." Because names had not been 
given by the respondents in the original survey, the person 
on the phone had to be asked if he or she was the person 
interviewed in March. If the person on the phone was the 
same sex as the original respondent, the question was simply
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asked, "Are you the person I talked to at that time?" If 
the new respondent was the opposite sex, the question was,
"Is the person that I talked with there?" If confusion 
existed about who the first respondent might have been, other 
biographical data from the first survey was used, such as 
age or party affiliation.
The second survey followed the form of the original 
one with only slightly different wording of two questions 
to accommodate the changes in events. For example, the 
question, "You have probably heard something about the 
negotiations between the United States and Panama over the 
new Panama Canal treaty. Do you agree that a new treaty 
should be negotiated, disagree, or haven't you formed an 
opinion yet?", had to be reworded. The new question was,
"You have probably heard something about the proposed treaties 
between the United States and Panama. Do you agree that the 
new treaties should be approved, disagree, or haven't you 
formed an opinion yet?" When no changes were necessary, 
the exact wording of the original questionnaire was used.
The first three sections of the first survey were used in 
their entirety with only the slight changes mentioned.
The fourth section, asking for biographical information, was 
not repeated since the same respondents were being interviewed.
Two additional questions were added to the new survey 
to determine sources of influence on the opinions held by 
the subjects, particularly in those cases where the attitudes 
had changed. The first question was designed to determine
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what individual person had most influenced the subject.
"how, thinking about what should be done about the canal today, 
what public official or private individual would you say has 
most influenced your views about the treaties?" The final 
question asked,"From what source have you received most of 
your information about the Panama Canal in recent months?"
CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS
The results of the first section of this study show 
that at the time this survey was taken neither foreign policy 
issues in general nor the Panama Canal treaty negotiations 
in particular were considered among the major problems 
facing the country by this group of subjects. As may be 
seen in Table 1, only 6 per cent of the sample mentioned 
foreign affairs as the most important problem facing the 
United States today. Of far greater concern were problems 
with the economy (33*8 per cent), energy (15*9 per cent) 
and unemployment (10.0 per cent). If unemployment and concerns 
with the economy are combined, the total reaches 43.8 per 
cent of the sample. The Panama Canal was not mentioned by 
any subject as the most important problem facing the United 
States today.
When questioned about the second most important 
problem facing the United States, there is a slightly 
increased concern for foreign affairs. As seen in Table 2,
13*9 per cent saw foreign affairs as a second most important 
problem facing the United States. However, nearly one-third 
of the sample was not sure or could not even think of a 
second problem, and no one mentioned the Panama Canal treaty 
negotiations in this question either.
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When asked specifically about foreign affairs problems, 
one out of four was not able to name one. Communism was 
mentioned by 15*4 per cent and the Middle Sast/Oil by 12.4 
per cent. Other responses ranged from Africa to peace and 
morality, but each received only a very small percentage of 
the total response. Only one respondent mentioned the 
Panama Canal as the most important problem.
Six out of ten persons interviewed could not think of 
a second foreign policy issue that they considered to be 
important. Those who could responded with communism, Africa, 
the Middle East, foreign aid, arms control and peace and 
morality. No category other than "not sure" was cited by 
more than 8 per cent of the respondents .
Subjects were more responsive when asked to rank 
foreign policy issues rather than name them. A list of 
five problems was read and subjects were asked which was the 
most important and the second most important. As seen in 
Table 5» one third of the respondents chose human rights 
throughout the world as the most important problem. The 
Panama Canal treaty negotiations were mentioned by only 3*5 
per cent.
When asked to rank the second most important problem, 
the responses in order of frequency were the Middle East, 
the Soviet Union, South Africa, human rights and the Panama 
Canal. Only 6.0 per cent chose Panama Canal treaty negotiations.
The results of the second section of the questionnaire, 
which is concerned specifically with the Panama Canal treaty
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negotiations, show that at the time the survey was taken, 
half of those questioned were riot sure whether a new treaty 
should be negotiated. As can be seen in Table 7> 36.8 per 
cent favored a new treaty while only 14.4 per cent were 
opposed. The results were quite different when the subjects 
were questioned specifically about a treaty that would give 
Panama greater control over the canal. Table 8 indicates 
that now only one-third were not sure; 34.8 per cent opposed 
such a treaty and only 28.4 per cent favored it.
The subjects were then asked to assess the strength of 
their opinions about a treaty giving Panama greater control 
over the canal. Those who opposed such a treaty tended to 
hold stronger opinions than those who favored such a treaty, 
but the difference did not reach statistical significance.
As seen in Table 9» almost two-thirds of the respo- 
dents, when questioned about the effect-on the United States 
if Panama were given greater control over the canal, felt 
that it would have an influence on the United States while 
only 19*9 per cent felt that it would have no direct effect. 
Those who felt it would affect the United States were then 
questioned further on just what the effect would be. Table 
10 indicates that nearly one-half of the subjects were not 
sure; 18.4 per cent felt that the United States rights to 
the canal generally would be denied; 19*9 per cent thought 
that United States trade would be hindered; and 10.8 per cent 
feared that it would impede defense.
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T A B L E  1
Most Important Problem Facing U. S.
Response Total 7°.
Economy 68 33-8
Foreign Affairs 12 6.0
Energy 32 15.9
Unemployment 20 10 .0
Morality 23 11.4
Other 27 13.5
Not Sure 19 9.5
T A B L E 2
Second Important Problem Facing the UN
Response Total
Economy 30 IE. 9
Foreign Affairs 28 13.9
Energy 13 6.5
Unemployment 18 9.0
Morality 13 6.5
0 ther 36 18.0
Not Sure 63 31.3
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T A B L E  3
ivio s t Impo r tan t Foreign Affairs Problem
Response To tal ... F-,
Communism 31 15.4
Africa 13 7.5
middle East/Oil 25 12.4
Foreign Aid, General 12 6.0
Arms Control 13 6 .5
Peace/morali ty 26 12.9
Foreign Affairs, General 19 9-5
Other 10 5.0
No t Sure 50 24.9
T A B L E  4 
Second Important Foreign Affairs Problem
Response To tal 7°-
Communism 13 6.5
Africa 9 4.5
Middle E as t/0 i1 13 6.5
Foreign Aid/General 3 1.5
Arms Control 12 6 .0
Peace/Morality 13 6.5
Foreign Affairs/General 16 8.0
Other 3 1.5
Not Sure 119 59.2
40
T A B L E  5
Major Foreign Affairs Problem 
First Choice
Problem Total %
Peace in the Middle East 48 23*9
Relations with the Soviet union 52 25*9
xiuman Rights Throughout World. 68 33-8
Panama Canal Treaty. Negotiations ? 3*5
Majority Rule in South Africa 18 9*0
Not Sure 8 4.0
T A B L E  6
Major Foreign Affairs Problem 
Second Choice
Problem To tal . . % .
Peace in the Middle East 63 31.3
Relations with the Soviet Union 46 22.9
Human Rights Throughout World 31 15.4
Panama Canal Treaty Negotiations 12 6.0
Majority Rule in South Africa 32 15.9
Not Sure 17 8.5
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T A B L E  7 
Should Treaty Be Renegotiated
Response To tal _ .
Agree 74 36.8
Disagree 29 14.4
Not Sure 98 48.8
T A B L E  8 
Should Panama have Greater Control
Response Total ..... .
Agree 57 28.4
Pisagree 70 34.8
Not Sure 74 36.8
T A B L E 9
. Panamanian Control Affect
Response To tal %
Yes 127 63.2
No 40 19.9
Not Sure 34 16.9
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As seen in Table 9, almost two-thirds of the respondents, 
when questioned about the effect on the United States if 
Panama were given greater control over the canal, felt that 
it would have an influence on the United States while only 
19*9 per cent felt it would have no direct effect. Those 
who felt it would affect the United States were then questioned 
further on just what the effect would be. Table 10 indicates 
that nearly one-half of the subjects were not sure; 18.4 
per cent felt that the United States' rights to the canal 
generally would be denied; 19-9 per cent thought that United 
States trade would be hindered; and 10.8 per cent feared that 
it would impede defense.
In the next question, a statement was read: "American
control, of the canal is necessary for the defense of the 
United States," and subjects were then asked to agree or 
disagree. Table 11 indicates that over half of the subjects 
believed that the canal was necessary for defense while one- 
third did not; 10 per cent were not sure. The subjects were 
asked to assess the strength of their opinions on this question 
and those who agreed held significantly stronger opinions 
than those who disagreed (F=15.88; p < .01).
The question about the value of the canal to the United 
States elicited a variety of responses. Fears were expressed 
that the communists might take it over, that Castro wants it, 
that it is necessary for naval operations and that control is 
essential in wartime. Such responses were categorized as 
"Defense, General." Others expressed feelings that the canal
lo
T A B L E  1 0
How would Panamanian Control
Affect the U. S.
Affect Total 71
Trade 40 19-9
Defens e 20 10.0
U. S. Rights to Canal 37 18.4
Panama Unable to Control 7 3-5
Other 9 4.5
Not Sure 88 43 .8
T A B L E  11 
Is Canal.Necessary for Defense
Response Total
Agree 114 56.7
Disagree 67 33*3
Not Sure 20 ,10.0
T A B L E  1 2
why is Canal Necessary or Unnecessary
Response Total /°
Trade 15 7.5
Defense, General 45 22 .4
U . S . Rights 9 4.5
Panama Can't Control 3 1.5
Not Necessary - Defense 40 19-9
Necessary - Unspecified 10 5-0
Other 9 4.5
Not Sure 70 34.8
is obsolete and not needed for defense because large ships 
cannot go through, that it is no longer strategic for the 
United States, that technologically the United States can 
do without the canal. These responses were categorized as 
"Not Necessary - Defense." Other subjects expressed concern 
for trade, for an unspecified need for the canal or for the 
rights of the United States generally. Table 12 indicates 
that over one-third of the subjects were not sure why they 
held a particular opinion; 22.^ per cent expressed feelings 
that, in general, the canal was indispensable for the defense 
of the United States; 19*9 percent felt that the canal was 
not needed for defense. Others expressed concerns about 
trade and Panama's ability to handle the operation of the 
canal.
Table 13 shows the willingness of these subjects to 
use troops to keep control of the canal. While a majority of 
those who had decided were not willing, the large "not sure" 
percentage suggests that in this sample subjects are far from 
unalterably opposed to such a step.
T A B L E  1 3
Should Troops Be Used to Control Canal
Response_____ To tal
Yes
No
Not Sure
59
79
63
29
39-3
31.3
^5
The results of the third section of the questionnaire, 
which was designed to determine the amount of factual knowledge 
about the canal held by the respondents, shew that at the time 
of the study, most respondents did not know which United 
States president had negotiated the original Panama canal 
treaty. As 'Table 14 demonstrates, slightly over one-third of 
the subjects could correctly identify President Theodore 
Roosevelt. The others were either incorrect or unsure.
However, as Table 15 indicates, 47-3 per cent of the subjects 
correctly answered that the United States leases the canal 
while only 15*9 per cent thought it was owned by the United 
States. Again, nearly one-third were unsure. The subjects 
were then asked what they remembered studying about the canal 
in school. As can be seen in Table 16, a variety of responses 
to this question were received. The fact that the building 
of the canal was a great engineering feat was mentioned by
22.9 per cent while 14.4 per cent remembered that a cure for 
yellow fever was discovered during the construction of the 
canal. The treaty and the way it was "illegally" obtained 
was mentioned by 6.5 per cent and the fact that the canal 
was a much needed east-west passage for trade was mentioned 
by 12.4 per cent; 34.8 per cent of the subjects either did 
not remember anything or did not respond to the question.
In order to determine whether there were any differences 
among the various sub-groups in response to questionnaire 
items, total frequencies were subdivided for each sub-group 
category--age, education, military experience, religion,
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T A B L E  1 4  
President Responsible for Treaty
 Response______ To tal______
Roosevelt 77 3.8*3
Wrong/Unsure 124 61.7
T A B L E  15 
Status of Canal
Respons e To tal __ P..
Owns 32 15-9
Leases 95 47.3
Not Sure 7 4 36.6
T A B L E  1 6  
What is Remembered About Canal
Response Total C-'L.
Engineering Feat 46 22.9
Treaty 13 6.5
Disease 29 14.4
Trade/East-West Passage 25 12.4
Other 18 9.0
Not Sure 70 34.8
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political party, income and sex. The resulting contingency 
tables were tested for significance using chi square.
Age was significantly tied to responses to a number of 
survey items. For the identification of the second most 
important problem facing the United States, there was a 
significant (p<.01) relationship between age and the problem 
chosen. Younger respondents were more likely to see the 
environment, civil rights, and foreign affairs as the most 
important issues while older respondents viewed the economy 
and unemployment as the most important.
There were no significant differences among sub-groups 
in response to the question asking what they saw as the most 
important problem in foreign affairs. However, when foreign 
affairs issues were listed and the subjects were asked to 
rank them in terms of most important and second most important, 
there was a significant (p{. 05) relationship between the most 
important issue and age. Younger respondents (18-29) were 
more likely to see human rights throughout the world as the 
most important problem (42.9 per cent), while older groups 
saw the Middle East and relations with the Soviet Union as 
more important.
There was also a significant (p{.01) relationship between 
age and the subjects ranking of the second most important 
problem facing the United States today. Younger respondents 
(18-49) saw the Middle East as the second most important 
problem; the oldest group (over 7°) saw the Panama Canal 
(21.4 per cent) and relations with the Soviet Union (21.4 
per cent). Of the respondents who chose the Panama Canal
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treaty negotiations, 33-3 per cent were 60-69* Almost half 
of the 50-59 age group chose human rights in answer to this 
ques tion.
Age was also significantly (p^.Ol) related to willingness 
to yield greater control to Panama. Older subjects were 
much less willing to relinquish power over the canal than 
younger subjects. Of the age group 60-69» almost two-thirds 
opposed such a move; of the subjects over 70, slightly more 
than half opposed. On the other hand, subjects 30-39 generally 
favored giving Panama greater freedom to operate the canal.
The age of the subjects was significantly (pf. 05) 
related to how they felt about the necessity of the canal 
for national defense. The older the respondents the more 
they agreed that the canal is essential for defense. Among 
respondents 60-69» eight out of ten felt it was necessary 
and almost all of those over 70 agreed. On the other hand, 
younger respondents were more likely to feel that it was 
not needed. Respondents 18-29 were split half and half over 
this issue.
The willingness of subjects to use troops to control 
the canal also varied with age (p^.001). Younger respondents 
were much less willing to use troops than older subjects.
Among the 18-29 age group, over half were opposed to the use 
of troops, 14.3 per cent favored using troops, and about 
one-third were unsure. however, among respondents 60-69, 
over half favored using troops to retain control of the canal 
while 22.7 per cent were opposed to such a move and 22.7 per
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cent were unsure about t.he question.
Age of subjects related significantly (p<.05) to 
identifying the present status of the canal. Older 
respondents were more likely to be unsure of the present 
status while younger respondents were more likely to know 
that the canal is leased. Of the respondents over 70, 
about half were unsure of the status, 23*5 per cent said it 
was owned and 23*5 per cent said it was leased. Among those 
60-69» 36.4 per cent said it was owned, 31*8 per cent said 
it was leased and J1.8 per cent were unsure. Among respondents 
30-39, six out of ten correctly answered that it was leased,
12.9 per cent said it was owned, and one-fourth were unsure.
The educational level of subjects was related to a 
number of the survey items. There was a significant (p^. 05) 
relationship between education and the ranking of important 
foreign affairs issues. Majority rule in South Africa was 
seen as the most important problem by 42.9 per cent of the 
respondents with a grade school education. Human rights 
throughout the world was chosen by one-half of the subjects 
with a grade school education and by one-third of those with 
high school education. Both the respondents with college 
education and post graduates were more likely to see the 
Soviet Union as the most important problem. Education also 
varied significantly (p<.05) with the willingness of the 
subjects to renegotiate the treaty. As the education level 
increased, subjects were more willing to renegotiate the 
treaty and more willing to give Panama greater control
over the canal.
There was also a significant (p<. 01) relationship 
between education level and feelings about the effect of 
Panamanian control of the canal on the Unted States. The 
higher the level of education, the more likely the subject 
was to feel that Panamanian control would affect the United 
States adversely.
Views on the defense question varied with education 
(p <. 001) . Among subjects with a grade school education, 100 
per cent thought the canal was necessary for defense. On 
the other hand, among college graduates, 58.3 per cent felt 
the canal was not essential while 37*5 per cent felt it was. 
Among those who had completed high school, 61.4 per cent 
felt the canal was needed and 20.5 per cent felt it was not. 
Interestingly, "post-graduates" were more likely to see the 
canal as necessary for defense than college graduates with 
60 per cent feeling it was essential and 40 per cent feeling 
it was not.
The responses to the question asking why the subject 
did or did not feel the canal was essential for defense 
related significantly (p^.Ol) to the level of education. 
Among the grade school respondents there was a tendency to 
feel that the canal was needed for naval strength and other 
defense matters while subjects who v/ere college graduates 
believed the canal was not necessary because they saw it as 
obsolete, too small, or not strategic. Only 32.4 per cent o 
these subjects felt the canal was essential to defend the
United States through naval operations.
The education level of the subject was also related 
(p<.01) to the question of troop use. The higher the level 
of education, the less likely the respondent was to favor the 
use of troops. Among college graduates, 56-3 per cent were 
opposed to the use of troops while 18.8 per cent favored such 
a move. On the other hand, among high school graduates, 29*5 
per cent were opposed to the use of troops and 40.9 per cent 
favored the use of troops to keep control of the canal.
N o t  surprisingly, education was highly related (p\.001) 
with the identification of the United States president 
responsible for the first treaty. The higher the education, 
the more likely the subject was to name correctly the presiden 
Predictably, education also related significantly (p<,001) to 
the correct identification of the status of the canal. Those 
with less education were more likely to be unsure of the 
status while those with higher education were more likely
to correctly say it was leased.
Military experience was another factor which seemed to 
play a role in influencing opinions on these issues. The 
respondents who had been in the military or whose father had 
been in the military were more likely (p<(. 05) to see foreign 
affairs as a major problem facing the United States. Among 
the respondents with no military experience, other problems
such as the environment and civil rights were more likely to
be listed. All of the subjects that cijose the Panama Canal 
treaty negotiations had either served in the military in the
/V3Rary ;
(\Mlll'iom & ^ at
college ^
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past or were married to someone who had served in the military.
Past military experience also showed a significant 
relationship (p<.05) with willingness to renegotiate the 
canal treaty. Of the respondents opposed to such negotiations, 
33*3 per cent had had past military experience themselves;
25 per cent had a spouse with past military experience; only 
8.3 per cent had no military experience.
There was a significant (p<.01) relationship between 
present military connections and willingness to give Panama 
greater control. Of those who favored giving greater control, 
82.5 per cent had no military connections and only 17*5 per 
cent were either in the military themselves or had a relative 
in the military. Those with a military connection were much 
more likely to have formed an opinion on this question. Of 
the respondents v/ith no opinion, only 2.8 per cent had military 
connections and 97*2 per cent had no military connections.
Among subjects with military connections, 40 per cent favored 
giving Panama greater control while 52 per cent were opposed.
The question of how Panamanian control would affect the 
United States related significantly to both present military 
connections (p^. 05) and past military experience (p<. 05).
Among respondents with present military connections, two-thirds 
felt that there would be an effect on the United States and 
none of the respondents in this sub-group were unsure of how 
they felt. The respondents with past military experience 
showed similar opinions.
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There was a significant (p<.05) relationship between 
present military connections (either self or relatives) and 
views on the defense question. Of the subjects with present 
military connections, 80 per cent felt that the canal was 
necessary for defense while only 20 per cent felt it was 
not. Again, none of these subjects were unsure of their 
opinion on this question. Among respondents with no military 
connection, 53*^ per cent felt the canal was necessary for 
defense and 35*2 per cent felt it was not; 11.4 per cent were 
unsure.
Respondents with military connections were also more 
likely 0p<. 05) to remember studying that the canal is an 
important Atlantic-Pacific passage while those with no present 
military connection remembered that the building was a great 
engineering accomplishment.
Somewhat surprisingly, religious preferences related to 
opinions in the survey. For example, Catholics were more 
likely (p<.01) than other respondents to favor a new treaty 
while Protestants- were generally opposed.
Religion was also significantly (p^. 05) related to 
the opinions about the effect of Panamanian control of the 
canal on the United States. Protestants were more 1 ike ly to 
feel that it would affect the United States than Catholics. 
Religious preference also related significantly (p<.05) to 
the defense question. Of the subjects who felt that control 
of the canal was necessary for the defense of the United States,
71.9 per cent were Protestant, 6.1 per cent were Catholic,
5^
?.9 per cent were Jewish or other, and 14.0 per cent had no 
religious preference. Protestants were the group most willing 
(p<. 01) to use troops to defend the canal. Among Protestants,
36.4 per cent favored the use of troops, 28.7 per cent opposed 
and 3^*9 per cent were unsure. On the other hand, among 
Catholics 57*1 per cent opposed using troops, 23*8 per cent 
approved, and 19*0 per cent were unsure.
Opinions in this survey were not frequently split along 
partisan lines. however, the relationship between party and 
the choice of a most important foreign affairs issue was 
significant (pc. 01). Of the subjects who chose the Panama 
Canal as the most important problem, 71*^ per cent were 
Republican and 26.6 per cent were Independent; no Democrats 
listed this problem as a major one. Of the subjects that 
chose majority rule in South Africa as the most important 
problem, 55*8 were Democrats. Among the total respondents 
who were Democrats, 41.7 per cent chose human rights through­
out the world as the most important problem and 20 per cent 
chose the middle East. The Republican respondents were 
divided in their choices; 26.8 per cent saw the Middle East; 
as the most important, 24.4 per cent saw the Soviet Union and
24.4 per cent picked human rights.
There were also significant (p<6 01) party differences 
in response to the question regarding the importance of the 
Panama Canal for defense. Among Republicans 58.6 per cent 
believed that the canal was necessary for naval operations 
and defense needs in general while only I7.2 per cent felt it
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was not needed or strategic any longer. Among Democrats,
37.8 per cent felt the canal was necessary for naval 
operations while 30 per cent felt it was needed but did not 
specify why; 35*1 per cent believed the canal was no longer 
essential for defense because it was obsolete, too small, 
not strategic, or not a main access route to the United States. 
Among Independents, 5° per cent felt the canal was no longer 
needed for the various reasons listed above.
Income related significantly (p<. 01) only to the effect 
of Panamanian control of the canal on the United States.
The higher his income, the more likely the respondent was 
to think it would affect the United States adversely.
Sex differences appeared (p<. 01) on the choice of the 
second most important foreign affairs problem. Of the 
respondents who chose Panama in this category, two-thirds 
were female and one-third were male. These results were 
reversed among those who chose South Africa: 62.5 per cent
were male and 37*5 per cent were female. The majority of 
males (51*6 per cent) chose the Middle East as the second 
most important problem while a majority of females picked the 
Soviet Union as the second most important problem.
More important in this study is the finding of a 
relationship between sex and willingness to renegotiate 
the treaty (p<.001) and between sex and the willingness to 
give Panama greater control over the canal. Of those who 
agreed that the treaty should be renegotiated, two-thirds 
were male and one-third were female. Women (67 per cent)
56
were far more likely than men (28 per cent) to be unsure of 
how they felt. Men were also more willing to give Panama 
greater control over the canal than women. Among those 
favoring such a step, six in ten were male.
Sex differences are again significant (p<.01) with 
regard to how Panamanian control would affect the United 
States. Among male respondents, ?0.1 per cent thought that 
it would affect the United States and 23-0 per cent thought 
it would not. Only 6.9 per cent of the males were unsure.
On the other hand, 22.9 per cent of the females were unsure 
while 59*6 per cent felt that it would have a direct effect 
on the United States.
The sex of the subject was also related (p<. 01) to 
opinions on the troops question. Again, females were much 
more likely to be unsure of their opinion than were men.
Of those subjects who were not sure, 29 per cent were male 
and 71 per cent were female. Among females, 25*7 per cent 
favored the use of troops, 33*9 per cent opposed and 40.4 
per cent were unsure. Among males, 33*7 per cent favored using 
troops, 46.1 per cent opposed and 20.2 per cent were unsure.
Males were more likely (p<.01) to correctly identify 
Roosevelt as the president associated with building the canal- 
suggesting that they had more factual knowledge about its 
history.
Survey II Results
The sampling procedures used in the second survey 
raise questions concerning the legitimacy of comparing
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directly the results of the two surveys to assess changes 
over time. A safer technique would be to compare results 
using only the answers of those 95 subjects completing both 
interviews. This has the disadvantage, however, of only 
utilizing half the original survey data.
While the second survey subjects cannot be considered 
a random sample, it does not necessarily follow that it is 
a non-representative sample. If it can be shown that the 
second sample is not systematically different from the first 
in terms of demographic variables or in the subjects* opinions 
on the items, then no bias should result in comparing the 
second survey subjects with the total sample in the first 
survey. Moreover, such a comparison has the advantage of 
utilising all the data.
Comparisons of the two samples on the demographic 
variables show no major differences. For example, there 
were 44.9 per cent males in the first survey and 47.9 per 
cent in the second. For income, 5^*5 per cent earned $20,000 
or less in the first survey and 55*5 per cent were in that 
category in the follow-up survey. In the first survey,
64.5 per cent were Protestant and 10.5 per cent Catholic.
In the follow-up, the comparable figures were 63.8 per cent 
and 11.7 per cent. Among the original subjects, 15*3 per 
cent had military experience compared to 15*0 per cent in 
the second survey. In the first survey, 12.4 per cent of 
the subjects were presently in the military compared to 11.7 
per cent in the second. With respect to education, 57 per
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of the original group had more than a high school education 
compared to 59.6 per cent in the follow-up. Finally, 68.7 
per cent of the original sample was below 49 years of age 
compared to 67.8 per cent in the follow-up.
A second kind of check on the representativeness of 
the follow-up group was to compare their answers to several 
of the questions on the first survey to those of the total 
group in the first survey. In answer to the question on 
renegotiating the treaties, 36.8 per cent of the total 
group approved while 14.4 per cent disapproved. In the follow- 
up sample, 41.5 per cent approved and 17 per cent disapproved. 
In the total sample 56.6 per cent felt that the Panama 
Canal was necessary for defense while 33*3 per cent did not.
The comparable follow-up figures were 53 per cent and 38 
per cent. With regard to the possible use of troops to 
defend the canal, 29• per cent of the original sample 
favored such a step compared to almost identical 29-8 per 
cent of the second survey group.
Since these comparisons uniformly suggest that the 
follow-up subjects do not differ systematically from the 
total sample, it seemed reasonable to compare the second 
survey responses to those of the total sample on the first 
survey, thereby making use of all of the data.
The results of the second survey indicate that 
although the number of people expressing a concern about 
foreign affairs tripled between March and October, 1977» 
the major concern of the largest number of people remained
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the economy and energy. The percentage of people naming a
foreign affairs issue as the major problem facing the United
States today in response to the first question on the survey
increased from 6 per cent to 18.2 per cent on the second
survey, as can be seen in Table 17. The Panama Canal was 
specifically mentioned by 10.5 per cent as the most important 
problem. No subject mentioned Panama as a response to this 
question in the first survey.
There was a substantial number of "Panama" responses 
in the entire first section of the second survey. These 
open-ended questions about problems facing the United States 
today were designed to allow voluntary responses to determine 
the degree of concern about foreign affairs in general and 
Panama specifically. There was a total of 37 "Panama Canal" 
responses to these four questions. In the first survey, 
there had only been three such responses.
When asked what they saw as the most important problem 
facing the United States today, one out of four mentioned 
the economy while 18.2 per cent mentioned foreign affairs. 
Those mentioning morality decreased from 12.7 per cent to 
per cent while the percentage mentioning unemployment 
or energy did not change significantly.
In response to the question about the second most 
important problem facing the United States today, there was 
again an increase in the percentage naming a foreign affairs 
issue although only four respondents specifically named 
Panama. Those who viewed the economy as the second most
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important problem decreased from 22.1 per cent to 15*2 per 
cent while those seeing foreign affairs as a significant 
problem rose from 20.6 per cent to 24.2 per cent, as indicated 
in Table 18.
The third question in this survey asked the respondent 
specifically about the most important foreign affairs problem 
the United States has today. Table 19 indicates that the 
most frequent response to this question was "Kiddle East or 
Oil." The second most frequent response was "the Panama 
Canal," with one in five believing this to be the most 
important foreign affairs problem facing the United States. 
Concern over communism and Africa were down as was peace and 
morality.
Panama was again mentioned by 25 per cent of those 
responding to the question about the second most important 
foreign affairs problem. Middle East/Oil and Africa were 
the second most frequent responses with each being given by 
about 19 per cent of the respondents. These results are 
shown in Table 20.
i/tfhen the five foreign affairs problems were listed and 
the respondent was asked to choose the most important, the 
choices in descending order were the Middle East, human rights, 
Panama Canal, Soviet Union and South Africa. Those choosing 
the Panama Canal as the most important problem rose from
3.5 per cent to 16.8 per cent. Table 21 shows the percentage 
of response to each issue.
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T A B L E  1 7
Most Important Problem Facing U. S
Problem Total %*
Economy 22 25-0
Foreign Affairs 16 18.2
Energy 17 19.3
Unemployment 11 12.5
Morality 3 3.^
Panama 10 10. *5
Other 19 21.6
T A B L E  1 8  
Second Important Problem Facing- the U. S
Problem Total %*
Economy 10 15.2
Foreign Affairs 16 24.2
Energy 9 13 .6
Unemployment 11 16.7
Morality 2 3.0
Panama 4 6.0
Other 18 27.3
T A B L E 1 9
Most Important Foreign Affairs Problem
Problem Total
Communism 8 11.4
Africa 4 5.7
Mid East/Oil 20 28.6
Arms Control 9 12.9
Peace/Morality 6 8.6
Foreign Affairs, General 16 22 .9
Panama Canal 14 20.0
Other 7 10.0
*The total is greater than 100% because Panama is included 
in the Foreign Affairs category.
T A B L E  2 0
Second Important Foreign Affairs Problem
Problem Total
Communism 1 2.8
Africa 7 19 .4
Mid East/Oil 7 19 .4
Arms Control 4 11.1
Peace/Morality 1 2.8
Foreign Affairs, General 10 27-8
Panama Canal 4 11.1
Other 6 16.7
T A B L E  2 
Major Foreign Affairs Problem
1
- First Choic
Problem To tal >
Peace in the Mid East 32 33-7
Relations with USSR 15 15.8
Human Rights 22 23.2
Panama Canal Treaty 16 16.8
Majority Rule in Africa 8 8.4
Not Sure 2 2.1
T A B L E  2 
Major Foreign Affairs Problem
2
- Second Choic
Problem Total %
Peace in the Mid East 22 23.7
Relations with USSR 25 26.9
Human Rights 6 6.5
Panama Canal Treaty 20 21.5
Majority Rule in Africa 12 12 .9
Not Sure 8 8.6
*The total is greater than 100# because Panama is included 
in the Foreign Affairs, General category.
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T A B L E  2 3  
Should Treaty Be Ratified
Response Total °/o
Agree 34 35.8
Disagree 30 31.6
Hot Sure 31 32.6
T A B L E  2 4  
Should Panama Have Greater Control
Response To tal cff°
Favor 34 36.2
Oppose 41 43.6
Not Sure 19 20.2
T A B L E  2 5  
Would Panamanian Control Affect the U. S
Response Total
Yes 56 58.9
No 27 28.4
Not Sure 12 12.6
T A B L E 2 6
. Panamanian Control Affect
Response To tal °k
Trade 13 27.7
Defense 12 25»5
U. S. Rights 10 21.3
Other 12 25-5
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T A B L E  2 7
Is the Canal Necessary for Defense
Response Total %
Agree 51 
Disagree 34 
Not Sure 9
54.3
36.2
9.6
T A B L E  2 
the Canal is Necessary or
8
not Necessary
Response Total %
Trade
Defense, General 
Not Necessary - Defense 
Necessary - Unspecified 
Other
4 8.2
13 26.5
14 28.6 
14 28.6
4 8.2
T A B L E  2 9
Should Troops be used to control Canal
Response Total _ .. %
Yes 31 
No 46 
Not Sure 18
32.6 
48 .4 
18.9
T A B L E  3 0
President Responsible for Treaty
Response Total %
Roosevelt 5° 53*2
Wrong 44 46.8
T A B L E 3 1
Status of the Canal
Response Total %
Owns 19 
Leases 58 
Not Sure 18
20.0 
61.1 
18.9
T A B L E 3 2
What is Remembered About Canal
Response Total %
Engineering Feat
Treaty
Disease
Trade/East-West Passage 
Other
29 41.4
4 5.7 
22 31.4
10 14,3
5 7-1
T A B L E 3 3
Most Influential Person
Response Total %
Carter
Other (Ford, Reagan, etc.
23 28.4 
) 58 71-6
T A B L E 3 4
Source of Information
Response Total %
Press 45 
Magazines 7 
Television 25 
Other 15
48.9
7.6 
27.2 
16.3
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As may be seen in Table 22, subjects, when asked for 
the second most important issue, responded, in descending 
order, the Soviet Union, Middle East, Panama Canal, South 
Africa and human rights. Those mentioning Panama rose from 
6 per cent in the first survey to 21.5 per cent in the second 
survey.
The results of the second section of the questionnaire 
are shown in Table 23. and 31*8 per cent of those questioned 
believed that the Panama Canal treaties should not be 
ratified by the Senate. In the first survey almost one-half 
of those questioned were not sure how they felt about the 
treaties. That number decreased to one-third in the second 
survey. Subjects that moved out of the ’’Not sure" column 
moved into the ranks of those who disapproved of the treaties 
as that percentage went from 14.4 per cent to 31*8 percent.
The percentage approving of the treaties remained relatively 
stable at 35*8 per cent.
When the question specifically mentioned that the 
treaties were designed to give Panama greater control over 
the canal, the percentage disapproving moved from 35*2 in 
the first survey to 43*6 in the second. However, the percentage 
approving of such treaties also increased from 28 to 35*8.
The percentage of respondents who were not sure whether 
Panama should be given greater control decreased from 37 to 
20, suggesting that the subjects had done some thinking about 
the canal treaties in the interim.
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It is interesting to note that, when asked to assess 
the strength of their opinions about giving Panama greater 
control of the canal, those who opposed held much stronger 
opinions than those who agreed. Of the respondents reporting 
that they felt very strongly about the issue, 64 per cent 
were opposed to the treaties. Of those who did not feel very 
strongly about the issue, six out of ten were in favor of the 
treaties. However, these differences did not reach statistical 
significance.
The respondents were then asked how Panamanian control 
of the canal would affect the United States and a total of 
55*6 per cent responded that trade or defense would be 
influenced as seen in Table 26. Other respondents were 
concerned with United States rights in the Canal Zone or 
Panama's ability to handle the responsibility and keep the 
canal open.
In the next question, a statement was read: "American
control of the canal is necessary for the defense of the United 
States." Subjects were then asked if they agreed or disagreed. 
There was little change in the percentage of responses to 
this question. Of those responding, 54.3 Per cent agreed 
while 36.2 per cent disagreed and one in ten was unsure.
These findings are in Table 27 . However, when questioned 
more specifically about why they answered they way they did, 
a much larger percentage (28.6 per cent as compared to 7,8 
per cent on the first survey) were not able to specify why 
they thought it was necessary, but gave generally "unspecified" 
reasons for defending the canal.
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Table 29 shows that 32.6 per cent of the subjects would 
use troops to defend the canal while 48.4 per cent said they 
would not. For this question, the biggest shift from the 
first survey was in the percentage who were not sure of how 
they felt; there was a decrease from 3i•3 per cent to 18.7 
per cent in this category.
The third section of the survey was again the general 
section designed to see how much factual knowledge the 
subjects had about Panama, When asked to identify the 
president responsible for negotiating the original Panama 
Canal treaty, over half of the respondents correctly identified 
Theodore Roosevelt. This indicated a major change from the 
first survey when only 38 per cent could give the correct 
response. Six out of ten of the subjects said the United 
States leases the canal rather than owns it. Less than half 
had answered the survey item correctly the first time.
In the last question in this section, the respondents 
were asked what they remembered most about the canal from 
studying it in school. The results are in Table 32. The 
major change from the first survey is the number of subjects 
who most remember the engineering feat and combating disease.
Two additional questions were added to this survey 
to determine major sources of influence on the subjects.
When asked to name the public or private person who most 
influenced their views, the president was the person most 
frequently cited, but only 28.4 per cent of the respondents 
said that he had the most influence on their views regarding
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the Panama Canal. The remaining 71.6 per cent named various 
other public figures such as Ford, Kissinger, or Reagan, or 
said no one influenced their views.
When asked about sources of information, almost one- 
half of the respondents received their information from the 
press while one-fourth depended on the television for 
information. The responses to this question are in Table 34.
As in the first survey, in order to determine whether 
there were any differences among the various sub-groups as 
to the significant problems, total frequencies were 
subdivided for each category of sub-group. The resulting 
contingency tables were tested for significance using chi 
square.
In this survey the responses to the question asking 
about the second most important foreign affairs problem 
facing the United States were again related significantly 
(p<.01) with age. As in Survey I, the younger respondents 
were more concerned with foreign affairs, generally. No 
other variable was related to age in the second survey.
Educational level in this survey was related to answers 
to the question concerned with the most important problem 
facing the United States today. Concern over foreign affairs 
was greatest (p<.01) among those who had some high school 
education, and among those who had completed college. Of 
those who had completed college, 45*5 per cent were concerned 
about economic conditions, while concern about unemployment 
was most salient for those who had completed high school.
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When asked specifically about the most important foreign 
affairs problem, there was, as in Survey I, a significant 
(p<.05) relationship between the choice of a problem and 
education. Concern about foreign affairs generally was 
decidedly higher among those who had completed high school. 
Those with some college and post graduates were concerned 
about the Middle East and oil, while those who had completed 
college were more likely to be concerned with arms control. 
Those with some high school were worried about communism.
The level of education also related significantly (p<.01) 
to the question of treaty approval, as it did in the first 
survey. The largest percentage of those opposed to the 
treaty had completed high school or had some college education. 
Among those favoring the treaty, 44.1 per cent had completed 
college and 26.5 per cent had done post graduate work. The 
respondents with only a grade shcool education were more 
likely to be unsure of how they felt about the treaties.
When asked specifically if Panamanian control of the 
canal would affect the United States, there was a significant 
(p<.01) relationship between the responses and education. 
Interestingly, both the number of "yes” and "no" responses 
increased with education. The respondents that answered 
"don't know" to this question were less well educated. Over 
60 per cent of the respondents with a grade school education 
were not able to be definitive with this question.
The next question asked if the respondent felt that the 
canal was necessary for defense of the United States. As in
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Survey I, the greater the education (p<.01) the less likely
the respondent was to see the canal as necessary for United
States defense. Among the respondents who had completed 
college, 54.2 per cent did not see the canal as essential.
For post graduates this figure rose to 60 per cent. In 
contrast, 100 per cent of the respondents with grade school
education and 5° per cent with some high school education and
65 per cent of those who had completed high school, felt that 
the canal was necessary for the defense of the United States .
Not surprisingly, there was, again, a significant 
relationship (p<. 01) between education and identification 
of the president who negotiated the original Panama Canal 
treaty. The higher the education, the more likely the 
respondent was to know the correct answer.
Military experience was again a factor in choosing 
the most important problem facing the United States (p^-.Ol). 
Among those respondents who had military experience, concern 
for the economy and morality were down considerably while 
interest in foreign affairs and energy was up. The respondents 
whose spouse or father had military experience also showed 
increased concern about foreign affairs. Among respondents 
with no military past, the economy was the major problem 
listed.
The religion of the respondent continued to relate 
significantly (pc.Ol) to his willingness to have the treaties 
ratified by the Senate. Catholic subjects were much more 
likely to have the treaties ratified than Protestants with
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72.7 per cent of the Catholics approving of ratification.
Of those opposed to the treaties, seven out of ten were 
Protestant.
The next question asked whether the respondent thought 
Panama should receive greater control over the canal, and, 
as in Survey I, responses varied (p<.01) with religion. 
Generally, Protestants opposed and Catholics favored such 
control. Among Catholic subjects, approximately eight out 
of ten favored giving Panama greater control while 56.? P©** 
cent of the Protestant respondents were opposed to such a 
move .
There were also religious differences seen in responses 
to the question of the effect of Panamanian control on the 
United States. Approximately 64 per cent of the Protestants 
responding thought that Panamanian control would hurt the 
United States. Catholics were split, with 45*5 per cent 
believing that it would affect the United States and 45-5 
per cent that it would not. It is important to note that 
among those with "other” religions, eight out of ten felt 
that it would not affect the United States. Eight out of 
ten Catholics felt that the canal was not essential to the 
defense of the United States while 68 per cent of Protestants 
took the opposite position (p<c.01).
The answers to the question about defense were also 
related (p<r.05) to the income of the respondent. Those with 
a lower income were more likely to believe the canal is 
essential for defense.
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As in Survey I, there were sex differences in answers to the 
question asking for the second most important problem facing 
the United States today (pc.Ol). There was a big increase 
in concern about foreign affairs among males. Of those who 
responded to this question with a foreign affairs issue,
75 per cent were male. Among males, foreign affairs was 
listed more frequently than any other category of response. 
There was a big increase among females in concern about 
unemployment and various other uncategorized problems.
Women were generally more concerned with the economy than 
were men.
The sex of the subject continued to relate significantly 
(p<v01) to responses to the question about treaty ratification. 
Males were more likely to approve than females while the 
largest percentage of females remained unsure of how they 
felt. However, the percentage of females who were unsure 
was significantly lower than in the first survey. Among both 
males and females, those agreeing with treaty approval 
remained fairly stable while the percentage who were unsure 
decreased and the percentage that opposed ratification 
increased from 14.6 per cent to 31*6 per cent. Females also 
continued to oppose giving Panama more control over the canal 
compared to men (p<.05).
The second survey attempted to assess the sources of 
influence on the respondents' views concerning the canal 
treaties. There was a significant (p<.05) relationship 
between the willingness to have the treaties approved and
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the person identified as having the greatest influence on the 
subjects' opinion. Of those that disapproved of the treaties, 
only 16.7 per cent said that President Carter had most 
influenced their views while 75 per cent gave varied other 
responses from "no one" to Ronald Reagan. Among those who 
were most influenced by the President, seven out of ten 
favored treaty ratification.
When asked in what way they felt the United States 
would be affected by Panamanian control, there was a signi­
ficant (p<.05) relationship between responses and the person 
identified as being most influential on the subjects' views.
In general, those who did not mention President Carter as 
most influencing their views were concerned with the adverse 
effect of Panamanian control on trade and. defense. Those 
who did mention the president as influencing their views 
were more concerned with other issues, such as United States 
rights in the Canal Zone. Over 90 per cent of those who did 
not mention President Carter as being an influence, mentioned 
trade and defense as areas to be affected by Panamanian 
control.
The question about defense also related significantly 
(p<*05) to the person most influencing the respondents’ views. 
Those subjects who were most influenced by President Carter 
were more likely to believe that the canal is not necessary 
for United States defense, while those respondents with other 
sources of influence were more likely to believe that the 
canal was necessary for United States defense.
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The identification of the president responsible for 
the first canal treaty also related significantly (p<. 01) 
with the respondents' source of information. Those who read 
the papers and magazines were more likly to correctly 
identify Roosevelt than those who received their information 
from television or other sources.
CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION
The hypothesis of this paper was that although the 
American public is generally apathetic to or, at most tolerant 
of, foreign affairs in most instances, the Panama Canal treaty 
issue is salient to the American people. Public opinion on 
the Panama Canal treaties is stronger than is typical on 
foreign policy issues. This salience is due not only to a 
belief that control of the canal is vital to the interest and 
defense of the United States but also to the belief that the 
canal represents a great technological accomplishment and an 
investment of American capital and skill. It was further 
hypothesized that for Americans, "bread and butter" issues, 
such as the possible interruption of trade between the east 
and west coasts with resulting higher prices, make this an 
important issue.
The results of the first survey indicated that, at the 
time it was taken, foreign affairs generally and the Panama 
Canal specifically were not the major concern of the subjects, 
especially when compared to such bread and butter issues as 
energy and unemployment. By the time of the second survey 
the Panama Canal treaties had been renegotiated, signed by 
the president, and sent to the Senate for ratification.
There was an increased concern about foreign affairs generally
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at this time and especially about the Panama Canal, presumably 
as a result of these political developments . Even then the 
proportion of the interviewees concerned about Panama was 
well below one-half, a figure well in line with the usual 
finding that Americans have little interest in foreign affairs. 
Ronald Reagan's ability to utilize this issue in his campaign 
must be explained by reasons other than its ingrained 
importance to the general public. ' Moreover, the intense 
Congressional opposition to renegotiation and ratification 
of the Panama Canal treaties may simply be another example of 
congressmen misreading the opinions of their constituents.
As it turned out, this opposition represented minority opinion 
even within the Congress.
It may still be instructive, however, to examine the 
bases of concern about the treaties among subjects when they 
are pushed to consider ratification and the importance of 
the canal to the United States. The majority of the subjects 
in both surveys indicated that defense and trade, a bread and 
butter issue, were major areas of concern. An additional 25 
per cent gave answers having vaguely to do with our rights 
of access to the canal, and only 20 per cent of those surveyed 
cited such reasons as the importance of the jobs of people
working in the Canal Zone or that Panama was unable to run the
canal efficiently.
Since such a large number of respondents believed that 
the canal is important for defense and trade, it is not
surprising that the issue of control looms large in attitudes
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toward renegotiation of the treaties. When asked in the 
first survey if they approved of renegotiating the treaties, 
a much larger percentage approved than disapproved (36 per 
cent to 14 per cent) although almost one-half had no opinion. 
However, when the respondents were reminded that the treaties 
would give greater control to Panama, the percentage of
disapproval rose to almost 35 while approval dropped to
about 28 per cent. This clearly indicates that while these 
subjects were willing to negotiate a new treaty, they were 
unwilling to give greater control to Panama. In the second 
survey, the largest percentage (35*8 ) remained in approval 
of ratification of the treaties although about 32 per cent 
disapproved and another 32 per cent remained unsure of their 
feelings. Again, when reminded that the treaties would give 
greater control to Panama, the disapproval rate increased to 
44 per cent while those who were unsure dropped to 20 per 
cent.
The issue of control is a critical one because it is
closely associated with both defense and trade which are
major concerns expressed by the subjects. It has also been 
the crucial issue in many of the other public opinion surveys 
taken on the Panama Canal. William Schneider of Harvard has 
observed that:
A look at all the questions asked over the 
past year reveals that "control" of the canal 
has long been the key issue to the American 
public. Any question which specifies that the 
United States will hand over control of the 
canal of Panama elicits a strongly negative 
public reaction--unless the meaning of
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"control" is further qualified.
In this survey and in others, the American people have 
generally been reluctant to give blanket control to Panama. 
The present survey did not have a follow-up question 
qualifying the control, but polls by CBS and The New York 
Times in October, 1977* and NBC in January, 1978 did. In 
both of these surveys, respondents were asked if they would 
approve giving Panama greater control, if the United States 
were guaranteed the right to defend the canal. In both 
cases, the qualifying statement received the approval of a 
majority of the subjects and reversed previous findings.
This seems to indicate that Americans are concerned primarily 
with defense of the canal and the assurance of its continued, 
uninterrupted usage, not with ownership per se or even who 
runs the canal. Indeed, when asked how they perceived that 
Panamanian control would affect the United States, subjects 
in both surveys in this study most frequently said that trade 
would be affected. The next most frequent response was that 
American defense and general rights would be affected.
This discrepancy between willingness to renegotiate 
a treaty and an unwillingness to relinquish control reflects 
the complexity of this whole issue and may go far in 
explaining the differences in opinions among the various
-^William Schneider, "Behind the Passions of the Canal 
Debate," The Washington Post. February 12, 1978, p. Cl.
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sub-groups studied. The present survey and most of the others
taken show that approval of the treaties increases markedly
with the educational level of the respondents. "The well-
educated tend to have a broader world-view, to understand
more complex and remote causes, to give more support to policies
39that involve no immediate, palpable benefits."^ In addition, 
they are more likely to understand the terms of the proposed 
treaties that would give the United States defense rights.
All education levels expressed concern for trade and defense, 
but the more highly educated subjects in both surveys approved 
of the treaties, obviously believing that the interests of 
the United States could be protected under them.
One of the surprising results of the present survey was 
the religious differences that continually appeared.
Basically, Protestants were opposed to the treaties, while 
Catholics overwhelmingly approved. Various explanations 
were considered, including the close ties between the Catholic 
church in North America and Latin America. The survey 
results were rechecked to determine if there were any other 
systematic differences confounded with religion. It was 
discovered that the Catholics in this survey had an abnormally 
high level of education. Of the Catholics questioned in the 
second survey, 18 per cent were high school graduates, 55 
per cent were college graduates, and 27 per cent were
-^Ibid . , p . C8.
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post graduates.
The most obvious explanation, then, for religious
differences is not religion, but education. The respondents
with a higher level of education support the treaties and
are willing to give Panama greater control over the canal
than those with lower levels of education. Differences in
opinion between men and women can also be explained, at
least partially, by differences in the levels of education,
since the male subjects tended to have a higher educational
level than females.
The control issue does not explain all the opposition
to the treaties. "The most compelling reason given by
Americans for opposing the treaties is that the canal is 
Zj, o
purs." There is a great deal of pride of ownership 
connected with the canal. It represents American success 
where others have failed and some feel that it was an act 
of kindness for the United States to build the canal in the 
first place.
We built it in a humanitarian way, by first 
wiping out the disease and suffering that had 
impeded other canal projects. We gave independence 
to the Panamanian people . . ., and we created an
unnatural resource which has brought great material 
benefit to Panama. Americans regard the Panama 
Canal as a monument to our technological know-how 
and to our humanitarian instincts, as a symbol of 
yankee ingenuity, not yankee imperialism.^
41 Ibid.
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In the present study, the subjects, in response to the 
question about what they remembered studying about the canal, 
most frequently cited the enginerring accomplishment (41.4 
per cent) and secondly the conquering of disease (31 *^  per 
cent) in the jungles of Panama. Others remembered the 
tremendous boost to world trade that can be attributed to 
the canal. These responses clearly indicate that the 
subjects do see the building of the canal as a major 
American accomplishment and feel pride in this achievement.
The results of these two surveys, then, show that 
American concern centers around the problem of controls.
The major difference among sub-groups seems to be explained 
by the fact that people with higher levels of education tend 
to approve of the treaties more, although they still express 
concern about defense and trade. Religious and sex differences 
in this study may also be explained by educational differences.
One point that should not be overlooked is the role of
the president in influencing public opinion. As Mueller
pointed out, the public tends to look to political leaders
for cues for opinions. "Many in the population grope for
cues on which to base their opinion. The perceived issue
position of various opinion leaders is often taken as an
42important guide."
42Mueller, Op. cit., p. 69*
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This tendency to look to the president for cues is 
apparent in the number of responses to questions about the 
most important problems facing the United States today. The 
first survey was taken at a time when President Carter was 
taking a stand for human rights throughout the world. When 
asked to choose the most important foreign policy issues from 
a list, the largest percentage (3*0 of respondents chose 
"human rights throughout the world" and only 2.1 per cent 
chose the Panama Canal treaty negotiations. In addition, 
there were a large number of volunteered responses about 
human rights and morality when subjects were asked to name 
the most Important general problem facing the United States.
In the second survey the results were quite different. 
Presidential attention had shifted from the general question 
of human rights to more specific problem areas such as Panama 
and the Middle East. Consequently, the number of people 
volunteering responses about human rights decreased and replies 
about the Panama Canal increased significantly. When asked 
to choose the most important problem, the Middle East was 
mentioned most frequently and the percentage placing Panama 
in the first position rose to 17.2 per cent. Those mentioning 
human rights decreased to 23 per cent.
These findings strongly suggest that the president is 
a focal point for opinion formation in the United States 
and leads a number of people to follow and support his position. 
This confirms the positions of Mueller, Rosi, and Sears.
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In the second survey, when subjects were asked to 
identify the person who had most influenced their views, 
those who named the president as a major source of influence 
overwhelmingly supported the ratification of the treaties 
and believed that they would have no significant adverse 
effect on the United States. On the other hand, those who 
said they were most influenced by someone other than the 
president (Reagan, Congress, Ford) generally did not support 
the views of the president. It should be pointed out, however, 
that only 28 per cent of those responding to this question 
named the president as the major source of influence while 
72 per cent named other sources. This might indicate that 
although the president has been able to focus the attention 
of the public on issues (first human rights, then the Middle 
East and Panama) he has been less successful in persuading 
a large segment to accept his position on the Panama Canal 
treaties.
It may have been that the president's recognition of 
this led to the massive campaign begun by the president and 
the State Department in the fall, after the signing ceremonies, 
to convince the public to support the treaties. The major 
theme of this campaign was that although control (i.e., 
operation) of the canal would be turned over to Panama, the 
United States' interests would be protected because the right 
to defend the canal and priority usage of the canal in 
emergencies would be retained. It was only after amendments 
had been added to the treaties guaranteeing these things that
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they were ratified by the Senate.
A recent Harris poll found that
although Americans now favor the two treaties by 
a narrow margin, they still are quite reluctant 
about handing over the canal. It was only the 
addition of the two key amendments dealing with 
the emergency rights for United States forces 
and warships . . . that tipped the public favor
of the second treaty.^
With these amendments the public now supports the
treaties 49 per cent to 41 per cent. The people are
willing to have a new treaty, but unwilling to jeopardize
American usage and defense of the canal. With these
guarantees, the treaties became clearly more acceptable to
the Senate and the public.
This question of the intricate relationship between
the formulation of policy and the public opinion is an
interesting one worthy of further study. Bernard C. Cohen
has observed that " . . .  the literature of political science
and history has veiled the crucial coupling of public opinion
44and foreign policy." Studies have been made to determine 
what the public opinion might be on a particular foreign 
policy issue, but just how and if the opinion affects the 
final policy of the government has remained illusive. The 
argument was made in the first chapter that presidents have
43^"Narrow Margin in U . S. Prefers Panama Canal Treaty 
Approval," The Washington Post, April 13» 1978, p. A 9 •.
44Bernard C. Cohen, The Public's Impact on Foreign 
Policy,(Boston; .Little, Brown and Company, 1973)* P* 26.
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been unable to conclude treaty negotiations with Panama 
because of strong public opinion.
General Torrijos frequently claimed that there were 
limits to treaty provisions that he could accept because of 
Panamanian public opinion. Ellsworth Bunker stated early in 
the negotiation process that the American public would have 
to be reeducated to accept the new treaties. These statements 
bring to mind several questions that remain unanswered by 
this study and suggest the focus for future studies. First, 
why were the treaties concluded by the State Department and 
the president in the midst of adverse public opinion? At 
what point in the policy formulation was the opinion of the 
public taken into account? Were there any portions of the 
treaties that clearly reflect public opinion rather than 
the opinions of the policy-makers themselves? The data 
necessary to answer these questions would obviously have to 
be drawn from the State Department files on treaty negotiation.
Although we cannot answer specific questions about 
how the public opinion influences the formulation of policy, 
what is indicated in this study is that the public attention 
can be directed to foreign affairs. Moreover, there is 
evidence that leaders such as the president can direct this 
attention and can influence the direction that attention will 
take, especially among the better educated public. It seems 
likely that the best explanation of Reagan's ability to use 
the Panama Canal treaties as a campaign issue was this ability 
of a leader to focus the public's attention. The fact that
8?
he was able to make the treaties an issue was not because 
Panama was already a salient issue, but rather because he 
was effective in making it stand out for the public and to 
generate adverse opinion.
People generally are more concerned with personal bread 
and butter issues, but if a foreign affairs issue can be 
made a bread and butter issue by opinion leaders, it becomes 
more important, at least temporarily, to the American public.
It must be concluded that there is very little evidence 
to demonstrate that the Panama Canal treaties constitute an 
exception to the usual public opinion-foreign policy 
relationship, despite Reagan's effectiveness with the Texas 
voters.
APPENDIX A 
Public Opinion Survey 
Panana Canal 
Survey I
Phone number:________
Name of interviewer:
Status: Completed ( )
Partial Interview ( )
Refusal ( )
No Answer ( )
ID Code:________________
*  • *  *  ■ * ■ * # ■ ) { ■ ■ *  -fr-fr-H- • *  * - *  -M- ■ *  *  ■ *  *  * •  -3fr • * * • « -  -M- *  ■ *  •«- * •  * * * * *  ■ *  - *  -B- -B- -M- *  • *  *  *  -M-
Hello, I am __________________ and I am taking a public opinion
survey for the Government Department at Williams and Mary.
1 would like to ask you some questions about issues facing 
the United States today.
Are you 18 years of age or older:
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
GO TO QUESTION 2 Is there anyone 18 or older at
home that I could speak with?
1. Yes ( ) 2. No ( )
WHEN THE PERSON END INTERVIEW
ANSWERS, REPEAT THE 
INTRODUCTION AND GO 
TO QUESTION 2.
2. What do you consider to be your home state?
SECTION I
3. What do you see as the two most important problem facing 
the United States today?
IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT MENTION A SECOND PROBLEM:
Is there any other problem that you think is important?
4. What about in the area of foreign affairs, what do you 
see as the most important problem facing the United Stat es 
today?
4a. Is there any other foreign affairs problem that you 
think is important?
5* I am going to list some current problems and I would like 
for you to tell me which you consider to be the most pressing 
problem in this list:
1. peace in the Middle East ( )
2. relations with the Soviet Union ( )
3 - human rights throughout the world ( )
4. Panama Canal treaty negotiations ( )
5 . majority rule in South Africa ( )
8 . not sure ( )
6. Which do you think is the second most pressing problem?
1. peace in the Middle East ( )
2. relations with the Soviet Union ( )
3 . human rights throughout the world ( )
4. Panama Canal treaty negotiations ( )
5 . majority rule in South Africa ( )
8 . not sure ( )
SECTION II
7 . You have probably heard something about the negotiations 
between the United States and Panama over the new Panama Canal 
treaty. Do you agree that a new treaty should be negotiated, 
disagree, or haven't you formed an opinion yet?
1 . agree ( ) 2. oppose ( ) 8 . no opinion ( )
7a. One proposal would give Panama greater control over the 
canal. Would you favor or oppose such a treaty or haven't 
you formed an opinion about this?
1 . favor ( ) 2. oppose ( ) 8 . no opinion ( )
GO TO QUESTION 9
8 . How strongly do you (favor) (oppose) giving Panama 
greater control over the canal -- very strongly, strongly, 
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?
1 . very strongly ( ) 2. strongly ( )
3* not very strongly ( ) 4. not strongly at all ( )
9 . Do you feel that if Panama were given greater control over 
the canal it would have any effect on the United States 
directly?
1 . yes ( ) 2. no ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 9a.GO TO QUESTION 10. GO TO QUESTION 10.
9a. In what way do you think it would affect the United States
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10. I am going to read you a statement and I want you to
tell me if you agree or disagree:
"American control of the canal is necessary for the 
defense of the United States."
Do you agree or disagree?
1 . agree ( ) 2 . disagree ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 13.
11. How strongly would you say you (agree)(disagree)-- 
very strongly, strongly, not very strongly, or not strongly 
at all?
1 . very strongly ( ) 2 . strongly ( )
3. Not very strongly ( ) 4. not strongly at all ( )
12. Why do you feel that way?
13* Would you.favor using United States troops to keep 
control of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion 
about this yet?
1 . yes ( ) 2 . no ( ) 8 . no opinion ( )
SECTION III
14. Do you happen to remember the name of the United States 
president who was responsible for negotiating the original 
Panama Canal treaty?
1. correct (T. Roosevelt) ( ) 2. incorrect ( )
3 • don't know ( )
15* The present status of the canal is rather unclear. Do 
you happen to remember whether the United States owns or 
leases the canal or aren't you sure?
1 . owns ( ) 2 . leases ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
16. Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal 
in school. What sticks in your mind most about the canal?
SECTION IV
17. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about 
yourself. What is the year of your birth?
18. How many years of formal schooling did you complete?
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1. some grade school ( )
2. completed 8th grade ( )
3* some high school ( )
completed high school ( )
5* some college ( )
6. graduated college ( )
7 . post graduate ( )
19* In what state did you go to elementary school?
20. Are you or anyone in your family associated with the 
military now?
l c'oT-pr'i  ^* no ( )r. s e n   ^ j G0 TO QUESTION 2.0a
2. spouse ( )
3 . son ( )
4. father ( )
5. other ( ) _________
GO TO QUESTION 21
20a. Have you or anyone in your family ever served in the 
military?
1. self ( ) 6. no ( )
2. spouse ( ) GO TO- QUESTION 21
3. son ( )
b . father ( )
c. n  t h p r  ( )
GO TO QUESTION 20b.
20b. When was that?
21. What is your religious preference -- Protestant, Roman 
Catholic, Jewish or none of these?
1. Protestant ( ) 2.
Other ( ) 5*
Catholic ( ) 
None ( )
3. Jewish ( )
22. Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a 
Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?
1. Democrat ( 
SKIP TO 22b.
8. Not sure ( 
SKIP TO 23.
) 2. Republican ( )
SKIP to 22b.
3 . Independent ( ) 
Skip to 22a.
22a.
22b. Would you call yourself 
a strong (Republican) (Democrat) 
or not very strong (Republican) 
(Democrat)?
1. strong ( )
2. not very strong ( )
8. not sure ( )
Do you think of yourself 
as closer to the Republican 
or Democratic party?
1. Democrat ( )
2. Republican ( )
3* neither ( )
8. not sure ( )
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23* Do you consider yourself to be a member of any racial 
minority group?
1 * yes ( ) 2 . no ( ) 8. not sure ( )
2*K For the purposes of our research, would you give me an
estimate of your family's gross income this year -- under
$10,000; $10,000 - $20,000; $20,000 - $30,000; over $30,000?
1. under $10,000 ( ) 2. $10,000 - $20,000 ( )
3 . $20,000 - $30,000( ) 4. over $30,000 ( )
8 . not sure ( )
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR HELP WITH OUR SURVEY.
1 . male ( ) 2 . female ( )
APPENDIX B 
Public Opinion Survey 
Panama Canal 
Survey II
Phone number _______
Name of interviewer:
Status: Completed ( )
Partial Interview ( )
Refusal ( )
No Answer ( )
The correct respondent not available ( )
Sex of the respondent wanted: Male ( ) Female ( )
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
A. Hello, I am ________________________and I am taking a pubic
opinion survey for the Government Department at William and 
Mary. I called this number last March to ask some questions 
about issues facing the United States today. (GO TO B or C 
AS APPROPRIATE)
B. (IF THE RESPONDENT IS THE SAME SEX AS ABOVE): Are you
the person I talked to at that time?
Yes ( ) (GO TO D)
No ( ) (GO TO C)
C. (IF THE RESPONDENT IS A. DIFFERENT SEX FROM THE ABOVE):
Is the person that I talked with there?
Yes ( ) (WHEN THE PERSON COMES TO THE PHONE, READ THE 
OPENING SENTENCE AGAIN AND THEN GO TO D)
No ( ) (TRY TO DETERMINE WHEN THAT PERSON COULD BE
REACHED AND THEN CONCLUDE THE INTERVIEW)
Thank you very much for your time.
D. I would like to ask you a few follow-up questions about 
issues facing the United States today?
SECTION I
1. What do you see as the two most important problems facing 
the United States today?
94
IF THE RESPONDENT DOES NOT MENTION A SECOND PROBLEM: 
la. Is there any other problem that you think is important?
2. What about in the area of foreign affairs, what do you see 
as the most important problem facing the United States today?
2a. Is there any other foreign affairs problem that you think 
is important?
3 . I am going to.list some current problems and I would like 
for you to tell me which you consider to be the most pressing
problem in this list:
1. peace in the Middle East ( )
2. relations with the Soviet Union ( )
3 . human rights throughout the world ( )
4. Panama Canal treaty approval ( )
5« majority rule in South Africa ( )
8. not sure ( )
4. Which do you think is the second most pressing problem?
1. peace in the Miiddle East ( )
2. relations with the Soviet Union ( )
3* human rights throughout the world ( )
4. Panama Canal treaty approval ( )
5 . majority rule in South Africa ( )
8. not sure ( )
SECTION II
5* You have probably heard something about the proposed
treaties between the United States and Panama. Do you agree
that the new treaties should be approved, disagree, or 
haven't you formed an opinion yet?
1. agree ( ) 2. disagree ( ) 8. no opinion ( )
5a. The treaties would give Panama greater control over the 
canal. Do you favor or oppose such treaties or haven't you 
formed an opinion about this?
1. favor ( ) 2. oppose ( ) 3* no opinion ( )
GO TO QUESTION 7
6.. How strongly do you (favor) (oppose) giving Panama 
greater control over the canal very strongly, strongly, 
not very strongly, or not strongly at all?
1. very strongly ( ) 2. strongly ( )
3* not very strongly ( ) 4. not strongly at all ( )
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7. Do you feel that if Panama were given greater control 
over the canal it would have any effect on the United States 
directly?
1 . yes ( ) 2 . no ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 7a GO TO QUESTION 8 GO TO QUESTION 8
7a. In what way do you think it would affect the United 
States?
8 . I am going to read you a statement and I want you to tell
me if you agree or disagree:
"American control of the canal is necessary for the 
defense of the United States."
Do you agree or disagree?
1 . agree ( ) 2 . disagree ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
GO TO QUESTION 11
How strongly would you say you (agree)(disagree) -- 
very strongly, strongly, not very strongly, or not strongly 
at all?
1 . very strongly ( ) 2 . strongly ( )
3* not very strongly ( ) 4. not strongly at all ( )
10. Why do you feel that way?
11. Would you favor using United States troops to keep 
control of the Panama Canal or haven't you formed an opinion 
about this yet?
1 * yes ( ) 2 . no ( ) 8 . no opinion ( )
SECTION III
12. Do you happen to remember the name of the United States 
president who was responsible for negotiating the original 
Panama Canal treaty?
1. correct (T. Roosevelt) ( ) 2. incorrect ( )
8 . don't know ( )
13* The present status of the canal is rather unclear.
Do you happen to remember whether the United States owns or 
leases the canal or aren't you sure?
1 . owns ( ) 2 . leases ( ) 8 . not sure ( )
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1A. Most of us were required to study about the Panama Canal 
in school. What sticks in your mind most about the canal?
SECTION IV
15* Now, thinking about what should be done about the canal 
today, what public official or private individual would you 
say has most influenced your views about the treaties?
16. From what source have you received most of your 
information about the Panama Canal in recent months?
Thank you very much for your help with our survey.
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